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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
REED MAXFIELD, and UTAH'S GREAT
GAME PRESERVE, a Utah corporation,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
Case No. 870424
vs.
OWEN A. RUSTON and
CAROL RUSHTON, his wife,
Defendants, Respondents.
OWEN A. RUSHTON and
CAROL RUSHTON, his wife,
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vs.
STATE OF UTAH, by and through
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL SERVICES,
Third-Party Defendants,
Third-Party Plaintiffs and
Co-Respondents,
vs.
REED MAXFIELD,
Third-Party Defendant.

BRIEF OF THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT AND CO-RESPONDENT
STATE OF UTAH; APPEAL FROM SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF
DISMISSAL, HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG, JUDGE; AND APPEAL
FROM DENIAL OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT HONORABLE
JAMES S. SAWAYA, JUDGE OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
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kIST_OEJPARTIEi>
The parties to this action are:
1.

Reed Maxfield, a Plaintiff, Third-Party Respondent,

Assignee of Interest, and Appellant.
2.

Utah's Great Game Preserve, a Plaintiff, Assignee

of interest in Chapter 11 Proceeding, and Appellant.
3.

Owen A. Rushton and Carol Rushton, his wife,

Defendants and Respondents.
4.

State of Utah, by and through Utah State Department

of Social Services, Third-Party Defendant, Third-Party Plaintiff,
and Co-Respondent.
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vLURIS&IC£IQMl»_STA^
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. Sec. 78-2-2(3)(i).

This appeal is from an Order of the

trial court dismissing the Plaintiff's cause of action because of
the Plaintiff's failure to diligently prosecute.
NATURE_0£_THE_PROCEEDLE&£
A.

The Plaintiff sued the Rushton's oyer the right of

Possession of Property Rushton's acquired from an execution by
the State of Utah and a sheriff's sale thereon October 1,
B.

1980.

The Defendants Rushtons sued the State of Utah as a

Third Party Defendant, claiming a right against the State if the
State conducted sheriff's sale was determined invalid.
C.

The State of Utah as a Third Party Defendant and

thence Third Party Plaintiff sued Reed Maxfield, Plaintifff now
as a Third Party Defendant on a claim that Maxfield's claim of
interest was based on fraud, and if the State were found liable,
they had a valid cause of action against ..axfield for
indemnification.
D.

Plaintiff Maxfield filed a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy in

Federal Court, naming his claim against Rushtons fet-Slj. as an
asset of his debtors estate.

The Plaintiff, as debtor, assigned

his interest in the Third District Court action to a family-owned
companyf Utah's Great Game Preserve.

The assignment was approved

as part of the plan or reorganization for the debtor, Maxfield.

- 1 -

E.

The matter of the legal action between Maxfield and

Rushtonf £t-.aLjLf was referred back to Third District Court.
F.

A final trial setting was set on September 15,

1987f in Third District Court with pretrial set August 31, 1987.
G.

Utah's Great Game Preserve, successor in interest

to Maxfield and as moving Plaintiff appeared by counsel at
pretrial along with all other counsel and Mr. Maxfield, and after
a hearing the trial judge dismissed the entire case for failure
ot Plaintiff to diligently prosecute the matter.

- 2 -

L£&Q£&-QK-AE££AIL

1.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in

dismissing the Plaintiff's causes of action for failure to
diligently prosecute.
2.

Whether the trial court committed reversible error

in denying Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment based upon the
pleadings, affidavits, and factual circumstances surrounding this
transaction.
3.

Whether the trial court committed reversible error

in denying Plaintiff's Motion For An Order Granting Plaintiff The
Immediate Right to Redeem prior to the trial of the case on its
merits.
4.

Whether the trial courts dismissal for failure to

prosecute extinguished Plaintiff's claim of superiority over bona
fide purchasers when Plaintiff's interest was being challenged as
fraudulent in nature.
£TATUTORy_£RQVISIQNS
None.

- 3 -

&TATEMENT_QE_THE_£A&£
Plaintiffs1 action was dismissed at a final pretrial
for the failure of the Plaintiffs to diligently prosecute the
case, which action was originally filed in the Third District
Court on October 20, 1980 (R 437-438).

This is an appeal from

the dismissal of that action.
The original action concerned the right of the
Rushtons, Defendants/Respondents to two pieces of real estate
purchased at a sheriff's sale (R 35, 41), and their right and
priority in the property as against a previously executed but
unrecorded deed to Maxfield, a partner in an alleged fraudulent
transfer from an alleged defective corporation.

The corporate

and individual deeds were recorded on said properties after an
appeal in the Utah Supreme Court was denied to the original
conveyor, Lester R. Romero, in March, 1980.

Romero was the

unsuccessful defendant in the Supreme Court Appeal on the
original judgment against him before Judge Condor in District
Court in an action in welfare fraud in 1979.

D^&rtment_o£.

&acial_&eE.vices_2A._Rgnietaf 609 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1980).
This is now a continued action on appeal by the
assigneef Utah's Great Game Preserve (R 269, 438-448), from the
assignor, Reed Maxfield, from a Chapter 11 proceeding filed by
Reed Maxfield in Federal Bankruptcy Court, on December 10, 1984.
The Chapter 11 proceeding included, in part, the assignment by
the debtor, to preserve to his estate and to the assignee, his
- 4 -

claimed
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Amended

2.

The Third Party Defendant/Respondent adopts by

reference herein the Statement of Facts numbers 12 through 25 of
the Defendant/Respondent Rushtons1 statement of the case, pages 7
through 9.
3*

Utah's Great Game Preserve/ as a result of an

assignment from Maxfield to this family-held corporation is the
party/plaintiff, and represented by Attorney Charles Brown (R
268-271).
4.

The Court denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary

Judgment; denied the Defendants' Motion to Dismissf on April 1,
1981 but at the same hearing granted Plaintiffs' Motion to Extend
Rights of Redemption for six months beyond the conclusion of the
litigation (R 62).
5.

Plaintiffs' second request for Summary Judgment was

heard by Judge Dee on September 25, 1984; said Motion was denied
(R 215).
6.

The case on Defendants' request, dated February 4

and 17, 1984f was set for trial on April 30, 1984r at 10:00 a.m.
(R 82-89).
7.

On a request of June 19, 1984, the case was set for

trial on September 10, 1984 (R 90), and Defendant Rushtons'
counsel, Mr. Nygaard, filed a Motion to Compel Answers and
Production of Documents on September 5, 1984 (R 180).
8.

Another delay occurred and a third trial setting

was scheduled on September 25, 1984, for January 10 and 11, 1985
(R 215).

Judge Dee denied another Motion for Summary Judgment by
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Both Defendants and Third Party Defendant/Respondent filed
objections to Plaintiffs1 request for a continuance dated August
11 and August 14f respectively (R 378 and 382).
14.

Motions from all parties were heard on August 24,

1987 and the Court denied Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss claims
against Plaintiff and denied Plaintiffs' motion to file a Third
Amended Complaintr and also denied Third Party
Defendant/Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment (R 43 6).
Plaintiffs' motion to continue the trial date had been previously
denied (R 424) .
15.

The final pre-trial hearing was held on the 31st

day of August/ 1987.

A lengthy pretrial conference was attended

by the Plaintiff/ his two attorneys/ Mr. Charles Brown and Mr.
Jeffrey Brownf Mr. Henry Nygaard representing the Rushtonsf and
Mr. Tanner and Mr. Schwendiman and Mr. McGee representing the
State of Utah.

Attorneys for Maxfield renewed their motion to

file a Third Amended Party Complaint adding parties and changing
the theory to a civil rights action, as well as their motion to
continue the trial date.

Judge Young denied said motions again

at the pretrial conference.

Attorneys Brown then stated that

without the Third Amended Complaint and additional discovery/
they were not prepared to go to trial on behalf of Plaintiffs and
made a motion to withdraw as counsel (R 437f 438-448).
16.

Plaintiffs' counsel also then told the Court that

they had not been paid nor had they been able to reach an
agreement as to their fee arrangement for the representation of
- 8-
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&UMMARI_QF_AR£UMENT£
EQINT_I :

BI &MI£SAL^EQR^E&ILI2EE _IQ_EEQ£ECU IE
This action was filed in October, 1980, as an action to

set aside an execution sale.

After initial motions and

pleadings, Plaintiff took no action for the years 1982 and 1983.
Defendants requested Trial settings in 1984, 1986, and 1987.
State of Utah requested Trial settings in 1987.

.Four Trial

settings had been set, Appellants not being ready to proceed at
any of the settings, continuously seeking more time.
was taken for the years 1985 and 1986.

No action

It was Defendants and

State of Utah pushing for Trial - Appellants acknowledged not
being ready to proceed after seven years.

The court did not

abuse its discretion.
EQINT _JLI:

NQ^ERROR _I N _D EN Y LNQ_SUMM ARY _J U DGMENT
The placing of the conveyance in issue as based on

fraud with accompanying affidavit and the premature nature of the
Motion before an Answer had been filed and before discovery was
complete was sufficient reason to deny Appellants Motion For
Summary Judgment.

Parties against whom Summary Judgment is

sought have a right to inference in their favor - which was
appropriate in this case.
EQINT_III:

QRDER^ALLQWINQ^REDEMETIQS
The courts order of redemption was effective as to

Appellant for any right that he can establish that he has.
right of redemption began to run on August 31, 1987,
- 10 -
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EQLHT_I
THE COURT ACTED APPROPRIATELY
IN DISMISSING THIS ACTION WHEN
APPELLANTS WERE NOT READY TO PROCEED
TO TRIAL AFTER SEVEN YEARS.
IN SO DOING, THE COURT DID
NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
Counsel for Appellants urges this court to believe that
the Trial Court arbitrarily and without basis in fact dismissed a
matter that should not have been dismissed.

This not only

distorts the true picture, but is a simplistic misrepresentation
of the record.

As the State has pointed out in its statement of

facts and as will be emphasized throughout this argument, this
matter has been pending for s.evg.Q_yg.ac.s. During that seven years
there have been four trial settings (R 89, 90, 215, 309), the
latest being in September 1987 when, Appellants and their counsel
told the court they were not ready to proceed.

The injustice

caused to bona fide purchasers of property through Appellants1
failure to prosecute the matter, after such an extended period,
was and continues to be highly prejudicial and damaging to
Defendants and Third Party Defendants State of Utah.
delay and unpreparedness is without excuse.

Such a

The court acted

properly when it dismissed the case.
In their brief, Appellants aver that it was
inappropriate for the Trial Court to dismiss the action on its
own motion.

This statement is made amidst partial fact as
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decided
of . a

K

^

court's usage of dismissal for failure to prosecute.

Among other

thingsf this court relies heavily on the ••record" of what has
happened in the case to the point of the dismissal.

A

determination must also be made as to the action/inaction,
preparation/non preparation of each party to the action.
The five criteria against which any matter is judged
was set forth in Ut^h_Qil_C.Q.niEany:^v*.^Hatris.f 565 P.2d 1135 (Utah
1977).

They are as follows:
1. The conduct of both parties.
2. The opportunity each has had to move
the case forward.
3. What each of the parties have done to
move the case forward.
4. What difficulty or prejudice may have
been caused to the other side.
5. And, most important, whether
injustice may result from the dismissal.
At the c e n t e r of each of t h e s e c r i t e r i a i s the

of the f a c t u a l s e t t i n g .

This c o u r t , for example, held

analysis

against

s e v e r a l defendants because they a l s o had an o b l i g a t i o n t o move
the c a s e s forward and did not do s o .

Such was the case in WnigJak

^L^Hfiwe, 150 P 956 (Utah 1915) , i g J i a s g n ^ v ^ F i t e b t a n i ^ l Q C ^ ,
P.2d 1368 (Utah 1 9 7 7 ) , and

571

DepattmeQt^fi£^£2G.ial^£ty:i£e£^YjL

Efimetg, 609 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1 9 8 0 ) .
The record of the instant case, however, clearly
establishes that the Defendants Rushtons and the Third Party
Defendant, State of Utah, have with regularity made effort to
move the matter to trial, only to be delayed by the Appellants.
- 14 -
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A third trial setting was set for January 10-11, 1985
(R 215), before Judge Dee, but just three weeks before that date.
Appellant Maxfield filed bankruptcy proceedings which in effect
stayed the proceedings in State Court and vacated the trial
setting (R 260-263).

Appellant Maxfield did nothing in

Bankruptcy Court to pursue his claim against either Defendant,
yet assigned whatever claimed interest he had to Utah's Great
Game Preserve, a family held company. Defendants Rushtons were so
frustrated in the delays and lack of activity on the part of
Appellants and the length of time that had passed that they filed
a readiness for trial in November 1986 in the State District
Court (R 264-467), and even though the matter was still in
Bankruptcy, Plaintiff's counsel filed a written objections with
the court on November 28, 1986 (R 268-271) stating that he had
not had time to familiarize himself with the case (even though he
had been involved in the Bankruptcy since at least March, 1986,
and had attended a settlement discussion with counsel for
Defendants and the State in June of 1986).

He had discovery to

do (which he waited a year to do) (R 316) and that he had no
financial agreement with Plaintiff (which was the case when he
filed his request for withdrawal in August, 1987 (R 438-448)).
It wasn't until the State of Utah filed a request in Bankruptcy
Court on January 2, 1987, which was later amended (R 368-371) for
permission to proceed to trial that Judge John Allen ruled that
there was no stay and that the Appellants should proceed in state
court (R 279-280).

Said ruling came on February 25, 1987, after
- 16 -

which the statef that same dayf filed a request for immediate
trial setting in state court (R 272-274).
Even then, it was the State of Utah and Defendants
Rushton who moved for trial (R 272-274)f when they filed their
request for trial setting on April 27, 1987 (R 291-293), not
Appellants.

Instead of seeking to move the matter along.

Appellants filed another "Objection to Hearing on Motion for
Immediate Trial Date And Other Motions now Pending" on May 18,
1987 (R 303-305).

Therein Appellant Maxfield stated that he was

not capable of handling the matter by himself - that he needed
the aid of an attorney (his previous attorney had withdrawn (R
285-286, 306-307) and Defendants had given him notice to obtain a
new one (R 289-290)).
The Court rejected Appellants1 objection, and at a
scheduling Conference on June 1, 1987, set a September 15, 1987
Trial date as a firm date with all discovery and motions to be
cut off on August 17, 1987 (R 308-315).

Immediately prior to the

cutoff date, Appellants moved for continuance of- the trial date
to yet do more discovery (R 337-334, 355-358).

At the final

trial and pretrial conference, counsel for Plaintiff stated they
were not ready to proceed to trial and withdrew as counsel. At
the pre-trial, Appellant Maxfield personally spoke to the issues
and did not in any way indicate to the court that he was ready or
that he wanted to move ahead without counsel.
The Appellant's submission of an affidavit to this
court six months later saying that he was ready to proceed
- 17 -

without legal counsel is self-serving, not part of the record and
was not made known to the lower court, even when Appellant
Maxfield, through his former counsel, objected to the proposed
Order of dismissal and through new counsel Edwin Guyon orally
argued the Objection (R 458-459, 470). This court has long held
that issues not raised in the lower court cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal.

This attempt to circumvent his lack of

action at the time the court made its ruling must be rejected.

A

similar attempt was summarily rejected by this court in M&&field
XjL-Eishler, 538 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1975).

In that case, Plaintiffs

appeared for trial without an expert witness and ill prepared to
proceed to trial after only two years.

The Court dismissed the

matter for failure to prepare and prosecute the claim with
reasonable diligence.

On appeal, the Plaintiff's counsel stated

that he "could have proceeded" using the parents only and without
an expert.

The Court rejected this self serving statement in the

following terms:

"The record does not show that a request to so

proceed was ever made."

In the instant case, the record is also

void of any such request since it was never made.

The court was

well within its powers and sense of justice to the Defendants to
dismiss this matter after seven years and four trial settings
when the Appellants (who had known since June 1, 1987) knew that
trial was set.

Instead of preparing, they wanted another

continuance and were not ready to proceed.
This court in the case of

Tfrompson^Dj$.gfr_j£g_mi>any_v^

Ia£li&QQ# 29 Utah 2d 259, 508 P.2d 528 (Utah 1973) upheld the
- 18 -

dismissal of an action filed in 1964 for failure to prosecute
when, after 8 years the matter had not been resolved and
settlement discussions had not resolved the issues. This Court
was clear that the entire "record" needed to be surveyed to see
what the circumstances were.

The court found that Plaintiff had

not been misled by Defendants and that the record established
that after the length of time in question, the Plaintiff had been
dilatory in his responsibility to move the matter forward.
A complete review of the record will reflect that other
than the initial actions in the fall of 1980 and spring/summer of
1981, Appellants have always basically sat back doing little
other than "reacting" to the Defendants attempts to get the case
tried.

It is true that Appellant Maxfield filed for Summary

Judgment in the summer of 1984 (R 91-92) and that some discovery
was done later that year (R 142-150, 198, 203). Appellant then
let the matter sit for almost three more years.

It was

Defendants and Third Party Defendants that kept pushing the
matter to a firm trial date through and including September 1987.
The State of Utah is perplexed that Appellants now
assert that they somehow were "active" on the case when the
entire record shows they were not prepared and basically fought a
resolution.

The State of Utah was ready and pushing for trial in

April 1984 (R 82, 89), September 1984 (R 90), and January 1985 (R
215).

Then, the State along with the other Defendants were

pushing since February, 1987 (R 368-371, 272-275, 291-3) and
ready to try this case in September 1987. Throughout this entire
- 19 -

process^ Appellants have never been ready to try this matter,
even attempting to change the theory of the case after seven
years by filing a motion to amend one month before trial and by
requesting a second time at pretrial the court's permission to
file a Third Amended Complaint (R 404-421).

The Court rejected

this attempt to amend once again (after such a lengthy amount of
time had passed) and held the Appellants to proceed on the
earlier pleadings (R 436). Even at that. Appellants weren't
ready to proceed to trial on the earlier pleadings though three
previous trial settings had been set and the fourth one was known
over three months before the final pretrial conference where
Appellants and their counsel admitted lack of preparedness.
The case of WestinghQuse_Electrjc_Supply_Cpmpany
Paul_Wt_Latsen_CIanttactgc.i._IaQ.*.f

y^

544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975) helps

to focus attention on that which is important in the instant
case.

In that case, the Court reversed a dismissal for failure

to prosecute, because the Plaintiff made a reasonable effort and
compliance within a three year period.
The Court looked at the conduct of both parties and
found that there was a reasonable excuse and unusual
circumstances that justified the behavior of the plaintiff.

The

court held that the Trial Judge therefore abused his discretion
in that the totality of the circumstances did not justify the
decision.

The court pointed out, that while the Plaintiff was

not overly faultless at his lack of activity, the Defendant had
allowed the matter to lie dormant and was not anxious to move the,
matter forward.

That is certainly not the case here.
- 20 -

This court acknowledged in We.s.ting.ka\i££ that reasonable
latitude and discretion is to be afforded the trial court.

The

length of timef while not being the sole determiner of the
court's actions, must be coupled with such activities that would
warrant a dismissal.

In Utah Oil Company.the Court looked at the

•'reasonably excusable" activities of the Plaintiff in determining
that a sixteen month delay was not sufficient.
Appellant Maxfield, in the instant case, has no
reasonable explanation, other than a trail of former attorneys
that he has not been able to work with (R 285-286, 438-448,
Supreme Court file containing withdrawal of Guyon), broken
promises to those attorneys, numerous avenues of delay without
any clear objective of what he wants as far as a course of
direction for the litigation as is evidenced by the Withdrawal
Affidavit and Motion that was filed by two of his counsel at the
Pre-trial in August 1987 (R 438-448).

It is not the Defendant

Rushtons, nor the State of Utah's fault that Appellants are is in
the position they are in.
As one looks at the criteria set forth in U£§.h_Oil, the
bona fide purchasers have been tremendously harmed, prejudiced
and continue to be held hostage to a Plaintiff that now claims he
was prepared, but has not shown in seven years that he is ready
to go to trial - even when he is on notice of when the trial is
scheduled.

The State has likewise found it difficult to find

witnesses, several of them having moved out of state, and others
whose purpose is to support the defense of fraudulent and/or non- 21 -

valid transfers of the deeds in question, because of the
countless delays created by Plaintiff.

Yet, the State pushed to

move forward, because this matter must come to an end some time.
It is certainly prejudicial and harmful to the State in its
ability to challenge the validity of the deed transfer and every
aspect of this matter due to the dilatory tactics and actions of
Appellants.
Defendants, likewise, have been in possession of the
properties and have had to repair, rent, pay taxes, etc. on the
properties for these seven years with only a counterclaim against
Plaintiff to show for all of the money and effort they have
placed in the property.
end.

At some point of time the matter has to

Appellants, by the record, have never been ready to resolve

the matter.

The record is also clear that so much money has been

placed in the properties by the Defendants, that at this point of
time, even if Appellants would win at trial, the offsets under
the counterclaim would be so great that there would little or no
recovery by them; all of this because Appellants have not
proceeded with diligence.
Several of the cases previously cited by the State in
this Brief, have factual situations that are less compelling than
the current case, yet the court sustained their dismissals.

In

tlaxfiald a complaint was filed in 1972 and depositions were taken
in 1973.

The Defendant in that case requested a trial setting.

Plaintiff objected to the trial request.

Plaintiff further did

not submit answers to Interrogatories until after a motion to
- 22 -

compel and five days before trial . The Plaintiff knew months
before of the trial setting, yet asked for a continuance
immediately prior to trial.

This was denied.

The attorney for

Plaintiff then admitted that they did not have an expert for
trial.

The matter was dismissed.

The only issue that seemed to

give this Court trouble was that an expert witness was not
absolutely necessary for the trial to proceed/ even though it was
clear that they were not prepared.
In Wilson, the Court recognized that the Plaintiff had
ample notice of trial setting and his unpreparedness after a
series of other events justified the dismissal.

A Complaint had

been filed in 1968 with little or no action until 1973.

Trial

was set for 1973 and postponed because of illness of the
attorney.

Trial was next set for 1977 with plaintiff moving to

vacate the trial setting.

The Court issued an Order To Show

Cause for failure to Prosecute.

The Court did not dismiss, but

set for trial setting a third time.

Nine months later, the Court

dismissed the matter because Plaintiff was on no.tice of the trial
schedule and was not prepared to proceed.
A similar case to the present circumstances was in
KA.L*.CJ.

where the action was filed in 1967 and after a failed

Motion to Dismiss, a counterclaim was filed and the matter set
for trial the following year.

Summary Judgment was denied,

counsel withdrew and a new trial setting was established for
1968.

There was no action for several years.

A third trial date

was set for 1976 which was delayed for further discovery.
- 23 -

A

fourth trial setting was established and the Plaintiff moved for
dismissal on his claim and against Defendant for failing to
prosecute his counterclaim*

The court agreed stating that the

facts of that case justified the dismissal.
Each of the three above cited cases, as well as other
cases herein point out that: (1) there were several trial
settings where the moving parties should have been prepared; (2)
there were periods of time where no action had taken place on the
case; (3) extended periods of time had gone by from the filing of
the case until the dismissal; (4) the parties were on notice of
the trial dates and scheduling and therefore had no excuse for
not being ready to proceed; (5) the parties against whom the
dismissal was made really had no justifiable reason for not being
ready; (6) The parties against whom the dismissal was made
claimed at some point of time that they wanted to proceed,
several even filing motions for continuance before the scheduled
trial setting; (7) the withdrawal of counsel at some point of
time in the process did not relieve the moving party from the
obligation of moving forward.
While these seven points are somewhat different from
the criteria set forth by this court to analyze such situations,
they do point out some common threads that this case has with
these, where dismissals were upheld.

When viewed as a whole,

comparing both the circumstances of the previous cases with the
current case, Judge Young not only appropriately, but with
reasoned discretion dismissed the case.
- 24 -

The Judge was familiar

with the 4-5 inch thick file, had reviewed what had taken place,
listened to the parties, hearing from Plaintiff personally, and
realized that Defendants Rushtons and the State had been and were
once again ready to proceed and the Plaintiff was not. After
seven years and sufficient notice, the action the court took was
appropriate and justified.
In looking at the common threads as delineated above,
there were; (1) four trial settings in this matter, most of which
were either continued or postponed because of the actions of
Appellants (R 89, 90, 215, 309); (2) there was no or little
action for the years 1982, 1983 (R 81-82), 1985 and 1986 (R 255264), except for what Defendants had engaged in which was
objected to by Plaintiff; (3) the case extended from October 1980
through September 1987 at which time the Appellants were still
unprepared to go to trial, still seeking more continuances
(R 355-358), discovery (R 355-358), and seeking to amend the
complaint for the third time (R 404-421, 436); (4) Plaintiff had
been on notice since February, 1987 that both Defendants Rushtons
and the State of Utah wanted and were seeking immediate trial
settings.
proceed.
309)*

The case had gone on long enough and they wanted it to
Appellant Maxfield even objected to these requests (R

On June 1, 1987, Appellants were on notice once again that

trial would be held.

This time, in a £ion_£irst pl^cer trial

Setting, for September 15-16, 1987 (R 309), 3k months in the
future.

Cutoff dates for all motions and discovery were set at

that time (R 309)•

When those deadlines came. Appellants still
- 25 -

sought more time and a continuance of trial date (R 355-358); (5)
Appellant Maxfield offered no excuse for not being ready, other
than they didn't like the work of his attorneys who asked to
withdraw because Appellant had misled them, had not entered into
agreements with them relative to fees, and was displeased with
their performance (R 438-448)•

This action on the part of

Appellant Maxfield two weeks before trial certainly should not be
used to create further injustice to the bona fide purchasers of
the property who would be further damaged by this inexcusable
behavior on the part of Appellant with his counsel; (6) Appellant
Maxfield contends now that he wanted to proceed and would have
had he been given an opportunity, yet the record is silent and
Appellant never did make such a request.

His own counsel said

that he was not ready to proceed, and Appellant had written in
May, 1987 that he could not proceed without counsel because he
was not capable of doing so (R 303-305), and; (7) there had been
withdrawal of counsel on two occasions which had nothing to do
with Defendants Rushtons or the State (R 285-286, 438-443).

This

was a matter between Plaintiff and his attorneys.
On one occasion, this Court overturned a dismissal for
failure to prosecute because the Trial Court had itself misled
the parties because of failing to notify the parties of a trial
date. £&§. EQ!&_YL*._l££LS.# 561 P.2d 1075 (Utah 1977). In X11QID&S.QD.
Hit£fcf the Court found that the Plaintiff had not been misled by
the Defendant in settlement negotiations and therefore could not
use that for an excuse as to his inaction. In the present case,
- 26 -

there is no evidence either that the Court or Defendants Rushton
or the State of Utah misled Appellant.

After seven years, with a

known trial date set at which the case was scheduled to "go" and
which was being pushed by both Defendants and Third Party
Defendants, Appellants simply were not ready and didn"t even know
what theories they wanted to push.

Even his attorneys did not

want to go to trial an_tlie_is.&u§.§.-.ttli.Q-bg.tfiiLg._the_GQ.U.tt (R 43 8448).

(Emphasis ours)
Based on the foregoing, Third Party Defendant, State of

Utah urges this court to recognize the lack of attention and
failure to pursue his claim that is so obvious. Certainly, the
Trial Judge, having been familiar with the record, acted in a
responsible manner as was encouraged by this Court in Bxask§.£..
Counsel has not been able to find a clear definition by
the Utah Supreme Court of what constitutes "abuse of discretion"
as might be applicable to this case. That is the standard that
this court has set forth in such a review. Many jurisdictions,
however, have grappled with this concept. The Michigan Appeals
Court in Pfi.Qpl§_v^Wol£ckgn, 2 Mich.App. 186, 139 N.W.2d 123
(Mich.App. 1966) stated:
The term discretion itself involves the idea
of choice, of our exercise of the will, of a
determination made between competing
considerations. In order to have an "abuse*
in reaching such determination, the result

must_b&_go_palEa^i^^§Qd-st&££ly.^y:iQiativfe_fi£
£a£i_aQSi_loai£ that it evidences not the
exercise of will but perversity of will, not
the exercise of judgment but the defiance
thereof, not the exercise of reason, but
rather of passion or bias. (Emphasis added)
- 27 -

The Wyoming Supreme Court added a further clarification
in Wa!d££E-£jL_Wea£g£r 702 P.2d 1291 (Wyo. 1985) wherein the court
said: "An abuse of discretion is that which &kgck&_tk§_£Qnsci§.nQ£
of the Court and appears so unfair and inequitable that a
t£as.aaabl§._Be.L§.Q.a^Q.o^ld_QQLt^a^idg.-.it.,,

(Emphasis added).

This

position was also accepted by the Louisiana Appellate Court in
&G.b.ueLg.t-Y.±.^Sc.liu.e.l£tf 460 So.2d 1120 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1984) when
it held that: "Abuse of discretion is defined as such abuse as
S.llQG.!lS._tllg—£Q.n§.g.ig.nQ.e of the court.

It must appear so unfair and

unequitable that t£asfiQable^E^t&QCL§._gauld-.afit^afeid£-.it* *
(Emphasis added).
Counsel for Third Party Defendant, State of Utah, was
able to locate a case from the Ohio Court of Appeals that dealt
with interpreting "abuse of discretion" in terms of a dismissal
for failure to prosecute a case.

In that case, SchiL£iQ£t^X.j-

K&Lsgn, 52 Ohio App.2d 219, 369 N.E.2d 800 (Ohio App. 1977), the
court sua sponte dismissed an action.

While recognizing that

such actions are severe and that the facts must warrant the
action, the court stated that "An abuse of discretion implies an
unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable attitude by the court."
This guideline needs further clarification.
in QafcL£L_£*_Iadtt&tti^

This Court

84 Utah 428, 36 P.2d

95 (Utah 1934) stated:
It would seem the words "arbitrarily" and
"capriciously" are used merely to
characterize a conclusion, when the
conclusion is announced with no substantial
evidence to support it or a conclusion
contrary to substantial competent evidence.
- 28 -

The Wyoming Supreme Court in La_RfeJi£££JkaLaSLi£# 457
P.2d 498 (Wyo 1969) held that "arbitrary* meant -willful and
unreasoning action, without consideration and regard for the
facts and circumstances presented, and without adequate
determining principle,"

The Court of Appeals for Kentucky in

Ilitttffian-£jL.ttetidianJttutuai-lafiutaQC£-CfiniBanXf

345 s.w.2d 635 (Ky

1961) stated that:
By "arbitrary" we mean clearly erroneous, and
by "clearly erroneous" we mean unsupported by
substantial evidence. By "unreasonable" is
meant that under the evidence presented there
is no room for difference of opinion among
reasonable minds.
The Nebraska Supreme Court in R£&ding_v._Gibb§., 203
Neb. 727, 280 N.W.2d 53 (Neb 1979) stated:
. . . In Domus [Domus Realty Corp. v. 3440
Realty Co., Inc., 40 N.Y.S.2d 69 (1943)] the
court defined the terms "oppressive" and "
unconscionable" as follows: "Tested by
ordinary definition and by common
understanding, 'oppressive' means conduct
that is unjustly burdensome, harsh or
merciless and 'uagga§.Q.ieiiabl£l_in£aaS.-GfiQdU£t
that_is_monstL&Us;^
tfi_the_conacienc.e • " (Emphasis added). From the above definitions of "arbitrary,"
"unreasonable," and "unconscionable" it is clear that Appellants
have not met their burden.

Certainly, the record shows the

attention paid by Defendants Rushton and Third Party Defendant,
State of Utah and the inaction and delay on the part of
Appellant.

Judge Young had a record replete with information

from which to make a rational, reasoned decision that the
Appellants had failed in their obligation to carry the matter
forward to conclusion.
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Appellants cite only a narrow selective part of the
record to argue that the Court abused its discretion*

Their

argument is hollow and unpersuasive when the "entire" record is
reviewed.

The State has attempted to point out what Judge Young

had before him.

Appellants have cited nothing that comes close

to meeting the burden of establishing that the action "shocks the
conscience" or is "palpably and/or grossly violative of fact and
logic;" that is arbitrary, unreasonable, unconscionable, or with
which a "reasonable person" would not agree.

The facts as

presented above and as are found in the 7 year record are clear
and straight forward.

The Defendants Rushtons and the Third

Party Defendant State of Utah, have been ready and pushing for
the matter to be heard.

They have resisted continuances (R 378-

379, 430-435) and further amendments that would have delayed this
matter further.

Plaintiff/Appellant was not ready to try the

case, had no valid excuse, and was simply dilatory in his
actions.
As this Court amply stated in Tho&psgn JDi.tG.ii, the
entire record must be surveyed to determine whether there is a
basis on which to sustain the lower court.

Such a survey reveals

reasonable, logical and judicious exercise of the inherent powers
of the court.

The actions of the Lower Court should be sustained

and this matter ended.
the lower court.

No injustice will result by sustaining

The bona fide purchasers will finally be able

to take what has been theirs for seven years.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The Third District Court's denial of Appellants Motion
for Summary Judgment on the 27th day of March, 1981 by Judge
James Sawaya and the subsequent denial of the filing of a third
amended complaint, as part of this record, sustain further the
rightfulness of the dismissal by Judge Young of this action in
chief, for failure to prosecute.

J^nkins^v^Taone, 27 Utah 2d

17, 492 P.2d 980 (1972) held that validity of deeds created an
issue of fact which precluded summary judgment.
Rulings on motions for summary judgment are not
reversed by the Appellate Court unless there is clearly an abuse
of discretion or the trial court is in error as a matter of law.
The burden is upon the moving party, and the defending party is
given the benefit of every doubt in order to ensure that parties,
if legally deserving, shall have their day in court.
The Appellant argued that the first Motion for Summary
Judgment filed before an answer had been filed or any discovery
had taken place was error as a matter of law.

The Defendants

Rushtons were only aware that they were innocent purchasers of
real property being sold by the Sheriff of Salt Lake County to
enforce a judgment.
On March 27, 1981, the Court heard arguments on
Defendant Rushtons1 Motions to Dismiss and Plaintiffs1 Motion for
Summary Judgment.

The Court denied the Motion for Summary
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Judgment upon the grounds that it was premature (R 52).
Plaintiff filed an Intermediate Appeal (R 104-106).

The

The

Intermediate Appeal was denied.
The Plaintiff/Appellant argues that the Affidavit filed
by Rushtons' counsel does not adequately raise questions of law
of fact to successfully challenge the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Judgement.

This argument was denied by the trial court

because the State of Utah had not been joined a necessary party,
the Defendants Rushtons were innocent bona fide third-party
purchasers under a sheriff's saler and that the relationship
between Maxfield and Romero raised a question as to the validity
of the deed from Romero to Golden Circle Investment Corp., to
Maxfield.
Secondly, there had been inadequate time to complete
discovery.
Next, Third-Party Defendants/Respondent State of Utah,
should have adequate time to file an answer to raise the legal
issues of fraud, joinder and the validity of the purported deeds
of conveyance.
The Court's denial of the Motion for Summary Judgment
based upon the above rationale is fully supported by prior
decisions of the Utah Supreme Court.
The Defendants were e n t i t l e d to have a l l the evidence
and i n f e r e n c e s construed in t h e i r favor.

In Bgw££_x.JL_Riv££tfin

CLifcXr 656 P.2d 434 (1982), the Supreme Court s t a t e d at page 436:
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If there is any doubt of uncertainty concerning
questions of fact/ the doubt should be resolved
in favor of the opposing party. Thus, the
court must evaluate all of the evidence and all
reasonable inferences fairly drawn from the
evidence in a light most favorable to the
opposing summary judgment.
The Supreme Court has furthermore declared that an
Affidavit is not even essential to successfully contest a Motion
for Summary Judgment.

Under Rule 56(c) U.R.C.P.:

The adverse party prior to the day of hearing
may serve opposing atfidavits, but is not
required to do so. He may stand upon his
pleadings providing his allegations, if proved/
would establish a basis for recovery.
[GbLEi&teQ£gB_K^_£inaa£ial^S£t^i££-Cfi^-clQ£j-r
337 P.2d 1010 (1963).]

The Defendants Rushtons' Answer, Counterclaim/ and
Third-Party Complaint joining the State of ^tah were filed
immediately after the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment was
denied/ specifically pleading the issues with particularity as
generally set forth in Defendants Rushtons1 and the State of
Utahs' subsequent motions and pleadings and have fully
established the existence of genuine issues between the
Appellants and Defendants.
Judge Sawaya properly denied the Motion for Summary
Judgment as the pleadings clearly set forth the question as to
title on the part of Appellant Maxfield/ and the Appellants have
wholly failed throughout this protracted litigation to prove
their title and/or interest and were not prepared to do so on
August 31/ 1987/ and Judge Youngf based on the record and the
representations at pre-trial/ acted properly in dismissing the
action.
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
FAILING TO ISSUE AN ORDER ALLOWING THE
RIGHT OF REDEMPTION IN THE PLAINTIFF
Judge Sawayafs Order of March 27, 1981, pte§exv£cL_£g>
Appellant any right of redemption he may have in himself or
through the original conveyor, Lester Romero or any of the
alleged invalid corporate entities or partnerships through which
Maxfield claims his chain of title*

That right of. redemption to

Appellant was granted until the end of February, 1988 as a result
of the Order of Judge Young dated September 30, 1987 (R 449).
Under Rule 69(f)(1) , U.R.C.P., those who can redeem are
limited to:
a)
b)

Judgment debtor;
A creditor having a lien by judgment or
mortgage on the property sold, on or some
share or part thereof, subsequent to that
on which the property was sold.

Argument III, on pp. 14-16 of Appellants' Brief clearly
misstates the facts and the law relative to redemption, and the
Order of Dismissal by Judge Young on August 31, 1987 clearly sets
forth that the right of redemption would run from that time
forward.
On November 30, 1984, Appellants' Motion relating to
rights of redemption was argued and the Court reserved ruling
until date of trial (R 230).
On December 10, 1984, the Plaintiff filed a petition in
bankruptcy, thereby staying further proceedings (R 260).
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Under these facts and circumstances/ there is not a
factual or legal basis for reversing the trial court's denial of
the Appellants Motion for Summary Judgment, or its decision on
the issue of the extension of the right of redemption.
Appellants' contention that the failure of Judge David
Dee to rule early precluded Maxfield's ability to so redeem is
without merit.

Third-Party Defendant and Co-Respondent State of

Utah have clearly taken the position throughout the length of
this protracted litigation that the right of redemption existed
and that the Order of Judge Sawaya granted said extended right
and that said right has existed all along until six months from
August 31, 1987.
POINT IV
THE VALIDITY OF APPELLANT'S
DEEDS/TRANSFER WAS NEVER
ADJUDICATED IN THE LOWER COURT
AND THE ISSUE OF THEIR STATUS
IN RELATIONSHIP TO THE STATE'S LIEN
IS THEREFORE IMPROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT
Appellants raise in argument a claim that their
unrecorded deeds took priority over the judgment obtained by the
State of Utah when the property was in the name of Lester R.
Romero, the Defendant in the welfare fraud trial that led to the
judgment from which the execution took place.

To support their

abbreviated and unconvincing argument. Appellants misstate the
record and cite no authority on point to support their position.
Even assuming Appellants properly argued such a claim,
it is improperly before this court since there has never been an
- 35 -

adjudication on the validity of the deeds Appellants rely on.
The validity of the deeds in question and the precarious nature
of Appellant Maxfield's relationship with Mr. Romero was placed
in issue when Defendants Rushton filed their answer in April,
1981 (R 53-56) • This was also the subject of discovery on the
part of the Defendants and the Third Party Defendant State of
Utahf and was heavily pled when Defendants amended their Answer
in August 1984 (R 183-188) and when Third Party Defendants also
clarified the Third Party Complaint in September, 1984 (R 204208)•

The State of Utah and Defendants also maintained this

factual defense as part of the answer to the second amended
complaint that both filed (R 328-329, 390-394).
The transfer and validity of the deeds in possession of
Appellants has never been determined in Appellants' favor.

This

was an issue that was maintained by the Defendants and Third
Party Defendant and pushed by them for inclusion in the defense
of this action at trial.

The only list of witnesses submitted to

the court, as per the Court's request, was a list of witnesses
submitted by the State of Utah (R 425-427).

The bulk of those

witnesses were for the purpose of establishing the improper
conveyance and invalidity of the deeds upon which the Appellants
rely.
Because this was an issue to be tried, not only was the
court proper in denying any summary judgment that was argued
regarding it (R 52, 215), but Appellant's failure to prosecute
the case brought to an end his claim under this issue since the
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court dismissed Appellants' action.
legitimate issue to appeal.
Appellants1 claims.

The Appellants have no

The lower court dismissed all of

The lower court's actions preclude

Appellants from trying the issues before This court. The only
legitimate issue for appeal is the court's dismissal for failure
to prosecute.

Since the court acted appropriately, responsibly

and with sound judgment. Appellants have no further claim in this
regard.
This court should not render an advisory opinion which
is exactly what Appellants are seeking.

They are requesting this

court to ignore the contested issue of the transfer and validity
of the deeds, assume all is valid, and award judgment in their
favor without the Defendants having an opportunity of presenting
their evidence to disputed his claim of valid ownership.
In Defendants Rushtons' Motion to Dismiss dated
December 19, 1980, Defendants state in specific terms that
Appellant " . . . Reed Maxfield must establish his relationship
with Lester Romero • . . M (R 8-10).

When the preliminary motions

were denied and disposed of, Defendants were required to file an
answer which they did on April 2, 1981 alleging that
Plaintiff/Appellant is not only estopped from his assertion
because of his fraudulent activity with Lester Romero, but that:
Defendants specifically allege that Maxiigldi

at^ng_ticie_had^aDy«tialatf.ul^iDt£t££t^ia^aQd.
to_£fce_£ai<i_ELeE£Ltyr and that daaiiaas.
between,Romero £nd Max£ield_were, fraudyleafc
£n nature as a means of trying to prevent the
State of Utah from knowing that Lester Romero
was the true and correct fee title owner of
said property. (Emphasis added) (R 53-56)•
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The court is reminded that at the time Defendants filed
their answer placing both the validity and transfer of the deeds
in issue, the State of Utah was not a party to this action and
had not been involved with any of the hearings or motions. It
was only through a Third Party Complaint that Defendants, not
Appellant, filed against the State that brought the state in as a
party, albeit a Third Party Defendant (R 57-58) . This was the
posture of the case through two trial settings (R 89, 90) and
into a Third setting (R 215).

Appellant Maxfield's attorney

filed a motion for permission to file a Second Amended Complaint
in December, 1984 (R 251-254) , approximately three weeks before
the trial was to begin. At the same time he filed a Bankruptcy
matter which stayed all proceedings (R 258-263)•
This was over four years from the date of the sale (R
10-11) and named the State of Utah and others for the first time
as Defendants well beyond the statute of limitations. A hearing
on Appellant's request to proceed on the Second Amended Complaint
was not heard for quite some time after which both the State of
Utah and Defendants were ordered to answer (R 308-314) • Both the
State's and Defendants' answers to the Second Amended Complaint
placed ownership of the property in question (R 322-329, 390394) .
The dismissal for failure to prosecute the case ended
Appellant's claim that he had a superior interest in the property
to that of the State of Utah.

Appellants were on notice since

1981 that Maxfield's claimed ownership was being contested (R 53- 38 -

56).

Instead of prosecuting that claimf and being prepared for

trial after seven years and four trial settings. Appellants now
want this court to intercede and rule in their favor as a matter
of law when it is an issue of fact they have never been ready to
defend.

For this Court to honor their request would be both

improper and prejudicial to the State of Utah and Defendants who
have always maintained that Maxfield's interest is both tainted
and improper.
For some reason, Appellants single this issue out for a
ruling when it is no different from the other factual issues that
were to go to trial on four different occasions - none of which
Appellants were apparently ready for.

It is, for example in no

different position than Appellants' claim that the properties
were not properly posted for execution, even though the Salt Lake
County Sheriff filed an affidavit that they were (R 23-23A).
These are factual issues that the Trial Court would need to take
evidence on before a ruling could be rendered.

Since there was

no trial, since the Appellants were not ready to proceed, and
since the Trial Court properly found that Appellants had not
prosecuted the case with diligence, the case with all attendant
factual claims was properly dismissed.
Counsel for the State of Utah have not been able to
find any cases exactly the same as that presented here on appeal.
Most cases, including those from Utah generally deal with simply
a judgment debtor and judgment creditor. In this particular case,
however, Maxfield claims ownership from deeds given him two (2)
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months prior to a trial (R 94) (in which he testified on behalf
of Romero) (R 116-121), not disclosing he owned the properties in
question (R 116-121) and holding them unrecorded until five days
after this Supreme Court ruled against the grantor of the deeds
in his appeal from welfare fraud and nine months after judgment
was obtained which attached to the property (R 100-103) (§.££
DeEattffi£nt^o£_&Gcial_&aLvi£££^Z^EQm&LO# 609 P.2d 1323 (Utah
1980) issued March 20, 1980 - deeds recorded March 25, 1980).
The properties were then sold to bona fide purchasers (Rushtons)•
The New Mexico Supreme Court has addressed a somewhat
similar fact situation in the case of «Ie.£fet§L-Y.jL«E.ae.l.f 99 N.M.
351, 658 P.2d 425 (N.M. 1982) wherein the court stated:
[E]quitable principles require that the
innocent purchaser should prevail over one
who negligently fails to record a deed upon
which he seeks to rely,"
The Colorado Supreme Court has taken a similar position
and has been consistent throughout the many years that it has
dealt with this subject.

That Court in Pgpple._y._B!2cas y 435 P.2d

894 (Colo 1968) reaffirmed its position in the early case of
WL&L&UkJlh!m

47 Colo. 3 97, 107 P. 1081

(Colo. 1910) wherein the court held that no unrecorded deed can
operate to defeat the right of a judgment creditor who obtained
the lien against real property prior to the recording of the
deed.

This position has also been taken by the Texas Civil

Appeals Court on numerous occasions as well.

See. XEE.&_fi£jL_5L

Cte^it^Uaioa^VjL^galia/ 605 S.W.2d 381 (Tex.Civ.App. 1980), Saqle
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Lpinbgr_Company._y^__Tr^jinhMif 365 S.W.2d 702 (Tex.Civ.App. 1963) ,
and &£&on&Ld_Y:^J?2K£ll_kunik££r 243 S.W.2d 192 (Tex.Civ.App.
1951).
While the Utah Supreme Court, in £ac, tgjmg i my, .gfcftfeeJM Ta&
Commig&iea, 4 Utah 2d 382, 294 P.2d 790 (Utah 1956), has given
some indication that it might reach a different conclusion, the
Court has never dealt with a situation such as the current one.
The State of Utah and Defendants Rushtons allege that moneys
Maxfield claims he paid were given to non-office holders of the
companies in question, were paid to fictitious persons (for which
no receipts have been produced, though promised in Maxfieldfs
deposition of October 18, 1984) , involved properties the subject
of welfare fraud*

He was involved with Romero to the extent of

acting as a holder of unrecorded deeds given to him immediately
prior to trial as against the properties in question (as an
effort to keep it away from the State), yet not recorded until
five days after this court affirmed the Welfare Fraud Judgment
against Romero.

Romero continued to collect ren-ts after this

purported property transfer until the properties were sold, when
Maxfield suddenly appears to claim a superior interest.
Certainly, KarfcckneE. did not deal with either facts like these
and particularly with a third party bona fide purchaser such as
Rushtons.
The cases from our neighboring jurisdictions, cited
above, while coming close to the situation presented here, set
forth the best approach in handling those matters involving a
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fact situation such as presented in this case.

To allow

otherwise encourages judgment debtors to "secretly" transfer
properties prior to trial and have them recorded after they lose
in years of appeals claiming they never had ownership at the time
of judgment*

Such a position is offensive to justice and

fairness.
Nonetheless, Third Party Defendant, State of Utah,
strongly states that even reaching this issue is not necessary.
As has been stated, the propriety and validity of any deeds and
their transfer to Appellant Maxfield were placed in issue in 1981
and have been continuously contested by the State of Utah and the
Rushtons from the beginning of this action.

What the law is in

Utah or other jurisdictions is at this point of time irrelevant
since this issue is not ripe for review by this court.

The

Appellants seek only to offset their dilatory and neglectful
actions in failing to prosecute this matter to conclusion by
requesting and expecting this Court to entertain the above
discussed issue sua sponte and decide issues as a matter of law
even though they have never been heard at trial.
In their Brief, Appellants cite little to support their
view that this court should step in now.

What they do state is

misleading, since (1) fraudulent activities as it relates to the
property in question has been raised against Appellant from the
beginning of this action; (2) there is evidence in Appellant's
own deposition and other discovery that consideration was not
bona fide and was not even paid to the party who claimed
- 42 -

Charles C. Brown, Esq.
Benneficial Life Tower #2000
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
William Thomas Thurman, Esq.
McKay, Burton & Thurman
Suite 1200 Kennecott Building
10 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Stephen C. Schwendiman
Assistant Attorney General
130 State Captiol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Lorin N. Pace, Esq.
University Club Bldg. #1200
136 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
DATED this

It

day of November, 1986.
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT

Henry feJ Nygkard
Attorney for Defendants
333 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
(801) 328-2506
NOTICE TO ALL PARTIES
Any objections to the foregoing certification or any
disagreement to any of the matters certified are to be filed
in writing with the Court within ten days of the date hereof,
served upon all parties, and noticed up for hearing upon the
law and motion calendar.
The foregoing Certificate is to be used in the Third
Judicial District Court as the Request for Trial Setting provided
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TO THE DISTRICT COURT:
Henry S. Nygaard, attorney for defendants Owen A. Rushton
and Carol Rushton, by his signature below hereby certifies that
in his judgment this case is ready for trial and in support of
such certification counsel represents to the Court as follows:
1.

That all required pleadings have been filed and

the case is at issue as to all parties.
2.

That counsel has completed all discovery; that opposing

counsel have had reasonable time to pursue discovery; and that
all discovery of record has been completed.
3.

That if medical testimony is contemplated or required,

copies of all existing medical reports have been made available
to all counsel or parties of record.
A.

That there are no motions that have been filed which

remain pending and upon which no disposition has been made.
5.

That reasonable discussions to effect settlement

have been purused by counsel and their clients but no
has been effected.

settlement

(Such discussions are to be realistic in

nature and not limited to an unresponded to offer.

The duty

to effectively negotiate lies with all parties.)
6.

Jury trial is waived.

Counsel further hereby certifies that the following
counsel or pro se parties of record were furnished with a copy
of this certificate on the 19th day of November, 1986, whose
last known addresses and telephone numbers are as follows:
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HENRY S. NYGAARD, ESQ. #2435
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT
Attorneys for Defendants
333 North 300 West Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Telephone: (801) 328-2506

II. [/..,
*.' I* O

. . W . N .

IN T H E T H I R D J U D I C I A L D I S T R I C T C O U R T IN A N D F O R S A L T LAKE C O U N T Y
STATE OF UTAH

REED MAXFIELD,
Plaintiff,

:
:

vs.
OWEN A. R U S H T O N and
C A R O L R U S H T O N , his w i f e ,

:

Defendants .

OWEN A . R U S H T O N and
CAROL RUSHTON, his wife,

C E R T I F I C A T I O N OF
R E A D I N E S S OF T R I A L

vs .
S T A T E O F U T A H , BY A N D T H R O U G H
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL SERVICES,
Third Party D e f e n d a n t s

Civil N o . 8 0 - 8 1 6 7

S T A T E O F U T A H , BY A N D T H R O U G H
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL SERVICES,

•J^-y
U

Third P a r t y D e f e n d a n t s
and Third P a r t y
Complainants,
vs.
REED MAXFIELD,
P l a i n t i f f and Third
Party D e f e n d a n t .

-i-

Minult BOOK rorm iiw

Cuunty of Salt Lake - State of o/tafa f L M i * H

4*

Pfc.nlitt

pfc«i

CASE NO:

C£*>8lk"7

Defendant

Type of hearing: Div
Present; Pltf

Supp. Order_
Other_
OSC._
Summons^
Stipulation.
Waiver.
Publication.
P. Atty: W l i p t E l ^ Z
^
D. Atty: S t e f h ^ w V W x y f ; v > s a ^ f % w A * / p \ u g ^ V n Default of Pltf/Deft Entered
Sworn & Examined:
°
v0
Date: ff-2g-ft4*
Pltf:
Deft:
Judge: t^MfTd fe^Da^f
ten LUo^
Others:
Clerk:^k
Reporter- P & V l r t v J W W )
Annul.
Deft._

Bailiff: ClSVKhM^VTv. LOn . Sfl^bsr-

ORDERS:
D
D

Custody Evaluation Ordered
Visitation Rights

D

Custody Awarded To

D
D
•

Pltf/Deft Awarded Support $
x
Pltf/Deft Awarded Alimony $
Payments to be made through the Clerk's Office:

•
D

Atty. fees to the
Home To:

D
•
D
•
D
D
•
G
D
•

Furnishings To:
. Automobile To:
Each Party Awarded their Personal Property
Pltf/Deft. to Maintain Debts and Obligations
Pltf/Deft. to Maintain Insurance on Minor Children
Restraining Order Entered Against.
Pltf/Deft. Granted Judgment for Arrearage in the Sum of $_
90-Day Waiting Period is Waived
Divorce Granted To
As
D 3-Month Interlocutory
Decree To Become Final: D Upon Entry
Former Name of

D

Basea on the failure of Deft to appear in response to an order of the court and on motion of PItfs counsel, court
orders
/
shall issue for Deft
_
Returnable
. Bail.

D

Based on written stipulation of respective counsel/motion of Plaintiff's counsel, and good cause appearing therefor,
court orders the above case be and the same is hereby dismissed without prejudice.

M

Based on wct&utip«taici»of respective counsel/motion of Plaintiff's counsel, court orders

=
Per Month/Year

D

Per Month
Alimony Waived

in the amount of.

^[\g^-^pXjatK"tAj[,%^ A^v^rfio^ ^4ey ^ i v w y u * / w

•

m

Deferred

. Is Restored

STATE OF UTAH
County of Salt Lake

)
) SS:
)

LINDA L. McGRATH, being duly sworn, says:
That she is employed in the offices of Beaslin, Nygaard,
Coke & Vincent, attorneys for Owen A, and Carol Rushton herein;
that she served the attached Motion to Compel Plaintiff to Answer
Interrogatories and to Produce Documents upon the following individuals by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope
addressed to:
Lorin N. Pace
Pace, Klimt, Wunderli & Parsons
1200 University Club Building
136 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Bernard Tanner
Steve Schwendiman
Assistants Attorney General
State Capital Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84141
and depositing the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid
thereon, in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah on the
Q

-

day of ifc^re-t, 1984.

Linda"!. McGrath
Subscribed and sworn to before me this

day of

Nptary P u b l i c ~
Residing^at Salt Lake City, UT
My Commission Expires:

The defendants, by and through their attorney, Henry S.
Nygaard, of the law firm of Beaslin, Nygaard, Coke & Vincent,
hereby moves the Court pursuant to Rule 37(a) 2 and 4 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure to answer the interrogatories submitted
to the plaintiff and its counsel and the Request for Production
of Documents that have been file for more than thirty (30) days.
The defendants further request, if appropriate, the
court order the plaintiff to reimburse the defendants for costs
and attorney's fees incurred.
DATED This

<^<J

day of August, 1984.
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT

Henry S. Nygaard
Attorney for Defendants
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HENRY S. NYGAARD, ESQ.
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT
Attorneys for Defendants
333 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, UT 84103
Telephone: 328-2506
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, .
STATE OF UTAH
REED MAXFIELD,
Plaintiff,
MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFF
TO ANSWER INTERROGATORIES
AND TO PRODUCE DOCUMENTS

vs.
OWEN A. RUSHTON and CAROL
RUSHTON, his wife,
Defendants.
OWEN A. RUSHTON and CAROL
RUSHTON, his wife,
vs,
STATE OF UTAH, by and through
Utah State Department of Social
Services,
Third Party Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH, by and through
Utah State Department of Social
Services,
Third Party Defendant
and Third Party Complaintant,
vs.
REED MAXFIELD,
Plaintiff and
Third Party Defendant.
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Civil No.

80-8167

receiving copies of the documents in this case on May 22, 1981,
from Henry Nygaard.

Jte^
DATED this 20

day of May, 1981.

li^fes
Assistant Attorney General

STATE OF UTAH
)
County of Salt Lake)

ss:

Stephen G. Schwendiman, being first duly sworn according
to law, deposes and says:

That he is the affiant herein; that

he has read the foregoing affidavit and knows the contents
thereof; and that the same is true of his own knowledge, except
as to matters therein alleged upon information and belief; and
as to those natters, he believes them to be ture.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this ^
May, 19 61.

^-—--^

' ~* cay of
V

\

/
Notary Pablic
" ~
Residing in Salt Lake County,
Utah '

/W.:

My Commission Expires:

of Utah determined not to attempt an execution during the appeal
process even though no stay against such proceedings was issued.
6.

That immediately after this court affirmed the trial

court, Mr. Romero and plaintiff had recorded deeds to the properties in question which bear the date of April 1979, but had
net been recorded until after this court had issued its opinion.
7.

That prior to execution, counsel for Mr. Romero and

affiant discussed possible settlement options, none of which
cane tc fruition.
8.

That affiant requested and did receive a preliminary

title report in the summer of 1980 relative to two parcels, which
were subsequently sold at sheriff's sale.

Said report listed

Mr. Maxfield as fee owner.
9.

Affiant had conversations with the renters at the

properties being sold, who indicated that notices had properly
beer posted and shoving interest in said properties for possible
purchase.
10.

Affiant also had conversations with the Salt Lake

Ccirty Sheriff's office relative to posting and notice and was
given verbal co^firration that all was m
11.

order.

Tnat affiant did knew that Mr. Maxfielc had filed an

action against the Rasntcns and nad talked with Attorney Nygaard
relative to the background cf t.ne case.

At no tine, hovever,

did tne State cf Utah receive copies of any pleadings, an\
nct.ces, nor was the State cf Utah ever ]omed as a part\ until
ii vas served with a complaint b\ the Rushtons in April, 1981.
12.

Tr.e State of Utau did not >»no* of any saniTiar\ }udc-

re:*: hearing until after it was completed, and did not know of
the issues therein involved.
13.

That the State of Utah, who did in fact prosecute

the sale, would need to present its evidence as to the issues
involved, now knowing what the issues of the suit are bv

SZZ-T.EU

G.

SCKi £ CDIMAN

.-.:s:stant Artorney General
256 Stare Capitol"
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 64114
Tel*-hone: 533-5261

IK THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE 0? UTAH

:CX?IELD,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,

r\* A RUSKTON &-& CAROL
. fr.TCN, his wife,
Deferdants and
Respondents.

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT
OF STATE OF UTAH'S
OPPOSITION TO INTERMEDIATE APPEAL
17719

No.

Stephen G. Schwendimar, having been duly sworn on oath,
states as follows:
1.

That he is an Assistant Attorney General for the

Stare of Utah.
2.

That in June 1979, he prosecuted a welfare fraud

action against Lester R. Romero in the Third District Court for
Sair Lake Co^rzy,

State of Utai, obtaining }udgrent on behalf of

the State, plus costs, in an amount totalling
3.
duced

$15,958.78.

That at the tire of trial, the Stare of Utah intro-

evidence fror the recorders and treasurers cffices of

Salt Lake Count} that Lester Fc.Tero vas even then Curie 1977)
rne owner of property, the sutoect of the action filed by Mr.
raxfield.
4.

That plaintiff Maxfield was called as a witness for

Mr. Romero and neither he, nor Mr. Romero ever declared that
the property had been transferred.
5.

Tnat Mr. Romero appealed that judgment and the State

£~XM/8t

i~ (f
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SCHEDULING ORDER

Plaintiff(s),

CASE NO. 0 2 0 - <tU1

vs
Defendant(s).
Pursuant to the scheduling conference held on OUvir> 1 (» ( » uA
the following dates were set and matters discussed:
'
1. This case is set for trial on: (1st place):
(3rd)~~
(2nd place): r1«iOkJ (4th) 2. Anticipated trial time^js _ '
TTUlD days.
3. The case is set for C5^n^jjur^/jury) trial. It jury fee is
not paid, it will be paid within 10 days of the date of this order by
plaintiff/defendant.
4. All discovery must be completed, including the filinp of
depositions with the Court, by
.
5.r A final pre-trial will be held before the Court on
i"B be ^£*Jr
_at
• .m. Counsel who will try
the case are to be present. Clients or an individual with authority
to settle are also to be present.
6. Date to hear dispositive motions is
7
Other matters

8. Counsel are advised that they should contact the Court's clerk,
Brad Willis, at 535-7506 at least one week in advance of a second place
setting trial date to determine if the case will be tried as a second
place setting.
9. The foregoing dates should be considered firm settings and
will not be modified without Court order and then only upon a showinp.
of manifest injustice.
10. This order constitutes the only notice that the Court will
send to counsel.
11
day of ^Jt
Dated this

DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies of this scheduling order were mailed to the following
parties at the addresses indicated:

LftviK f W ^

Dated

r & £ . 5cu*k

ICIIMAU f

Sir.

9=fiU

Court/dlerk
r\Dc

i \ .'

1

W. \

%J§ \i*

«

SCHEDULING ORDER
V

PlaintiVf(s),

CASE NO.

C&n-yitH

JUilM J W v s t t v \ ui cAAX
Defendant(s)
Pursuant to the scheduling conference held on
the following dates were set and matters discussed:

j^m±.

(3rd)
This case is set for trial on: (1st place):
(2nd p l a c e ) :ifr3frff4
(4th);
2. A n t i c i p a t e d t r i a l r i mg^ S s i _^
fiyyjL
days.
The case is set for Qion-jur^'^^^y) trial. If* jury fee is
3
not paid,
it will be paid within lu days of the date of this order by
piaintiff/defendant.
4. All discovery must be completed, including the filing of
depositions with the Court, by
—
•—•
.
Affinal pre-trial will be held before the Court on
at
' W <^*7
.
S y ^ L _ _ / l •xn- Counsel who will trv
the cascfareto be present. Clients or an individual with authority
to settle are also to be present.
6. Date to hear dispositive motions is
7. Other matters:
1.

8. Counsel are advised that they should contact the Court's clerl
Erad Willis, at 535-7506 at least one week in advance of a second place
setting trial date to determine if the case will be tried as a second
place setting.
9. The foregoing dates should be considered firm settings and
will not be modified without Court order and then only upon a showing
of manifest injustice.
10. This order constitutes the only notice that the Court will
send to counsel.
Dated this
^
day of
tf$^>£
, 19 ^ V

DAVTD R. DEE
DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies of this scheduling order were mailed to the following
the. addresses indicate^:
maicatexi: t AA QQ AA y
pflrties at thc^addresses
^(j^\2>t0^

i^^MJtiu noo i^^j^^v^ loQph m\\
328-gl5Q(b
Dat

^rfi}Et5p9tt:

1 II

NOTICE TO ALL PARTIES

2
3 ||
4
5
5
7

Any objections to the above certification or any
disagreement to any of the matters certified are to be filed in
|| writing with the court within ten days of the date hereof, served
upon all parties, and noticed up for hearing upon the law and
j[ motion calendar.
The foregoing Certificate is to be used in the Third
| Judicial District Court as the Request for Trial Setting provided
in Rule 4.1 of the Rules of Practice of the District and Circuit
|j Courts, effective March 1, 1982

8 I
9
10
11

5

7

9

BY THE COURT

1

required, copies of all existing medical reports have been made

2

available to all counsel or parties of record.

3
4

4.

That there are no motions that have been filed

which remain ponding and upon which no disposition has been made.

5

5.

That reasonable discussions to effect settlement

6

have been pursued by counsel and their clients but no settlement

7

has been effected.

8

nature and not limited to an unresponded to offer.

9

effectively negotiate lies with all parties.)

10

6.

(Such discussions are to be realistic in

Jury trial is waived.

The duty to

If demanded, $50.00 fee to

11 ij be enclosed.

12 I

Counsel further hereby certifies that the following

13 "counsel or pro se parties of record were furnished with a copy of
A

14

this certificate on the

15

known address and telephone number is as follows:

16
17

NAME

ADDRESS

Mr. Lorin M. Pace
Attorney at Law

18
19
20

day of February, 1984, whose last

DATED This

TELEPHONE

431 South 300 East
Suite B-l
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
7

328-9623

day of February, 1984.
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT

21

7 1 i:<
22
23
24

Henry S. Nygaard
Attorney for Defendants
333 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, UT 84103
Telephone: (801) 328-2506

25
-2-

r::.i>
'• ;u (

V?

FEB 10 2 5oPH.°?

ji HENRY S. NYGAARD
; BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT

:: Attorneys for Defendants
,i 333 North 300 West
! Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
1
Telephone No. 328-2506

1

H.01X0K .'••;

ERK

£i\&^

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKF COUNTY

2

STATE OF UTAH

3
4

REED MAXFIELD,

5
6
7

Plaintiff,

CERTIFICATE OF READINESS
FOR TRIAL

vs.
OWEN A. RUSHTON and
CAROL RUSHTON, his wife,

Civil No. (180-8167

8

Defendants,
9
10
11

TO THE DISTRICT COURT:
Henry S. Nygaard, attorney for Defendants, Owen A.

12

Rushton and Carol Rushton, by his signature below hereby certi-

13

fies that in his judgnent the case is ready for trial and in

14

support of such certification counsel represents to the Court

15

as follows:

16
17
18

1.

That all required pleadings have been filed and the

case is at issue as to all parties.
2.

That counsel has completed all discovery; that

19

opposing counsel has had reasonable time to pursue discovery; and

20

that all discovery of record has been completed.

21

3.

That if medical testimony is contemplated or

-3

any way, interfering with Defendant's tenants, or in any way
receiving any rentals in the future.
WHERFFORE, the Defendants pray that the Court enter
Judgment on the Counterclaim as follows:
1.

Defendants be awarded a Judgment in the sum of $800.00

for rents improperly retained by the Plaintiff.
2.

]

Plaintiff be ordered to refrain from in any way

interfering with Defendant's tenants or obtaining any of the
rents owing by tenant to the Defendant.
3. Any other relief the Court deems just in the premises.
DATED this

/

day of April, 1981.
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT

Henry; s/jfygaard
Attorney for Defendants

-2-

3.

The Plaintiff's are estopped from making any claim

against said property because of their fradulent conduct in
connection with Lester Romero, and therefore, should be denied
any relief.
4.

The Defendants further allege:
A.

Admit allegations contained in paragraphs one,

two, three, and four of said Complaint.
B.

Deny allegations contained in paragraphs five,

six, seven, eight, and nine of said Complaint.
C.

Defendants specifically allege that Maxfield at

no time had any rightful interest in and to the said property, and
that dealings between Romero and Maxfield were fraudulent in
nature as a means of trying to prevent the State of Utah from
knowing that Lester Romero was the true and correct fee title
owner of said property.
WHEREFORE, the Defendants pray that the Plaintiffs
Complaint be dismissed with prejudice, the Plaintiff to bear all
costs of this action.
COUNTERCLAIM
The Defendants, Owen Rushton and Carol Rushton, his wife,
counterclaim against the
1.

Plaintiff as follows:

Since October 1, 1980, the date said property was sold

by Sheriff's Sale, the Plaintiff personally and by and through his
agent, Lester Romero, have continually harrassed the tenants of
the Plaintiff with respect to said premises, and have been
wrongfully collecting the rents, thus depriving Rushton's, the
owners of the property, the rents to which they are entitled.
2.

The Plaintiffs have received approximately $800.00

in rents that is the property of the Defendants.

Defendants have

made demand for return of said rents, but the Plaintiff has
refused to pay said rents over to the Defendants.
3.

The Defendants are entitled to receipt of the rents,

improperly obtained by the Plaintiff, and are further entitled to
an Order of this Court compelling the Plaintiff to refrain from in

000054
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HENRY S. NYGAARD, ESQ.
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE 6 VINCENT
Attorneys for Defendants
1100 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone No. (801) 328-2506
IN THE THIJtD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

REED MAXFIELD,
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM

Plaintiff,
vs.
OWEN A. RUSHTON, and
CAROL RUSHTON, his wife,
Defendants.

OWEN A. RUSHTON, and
CAROL RUSHTON, his wife,

Third-Party P l a i n t i f f s , :
vs.

:

STATE OF UTAH, by and through
Utah State Department of Social
Services,

:
:

Third-Party Defendants. :

Civil No. 80-8167

The Defendants answer the Flaintiff's Complaint as follows!:
1.

That the Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a

cause of action upon which relief can be granted, and therefore
said Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.
2.

That the Plaintiff, Reed Maxfie3d has no interest

in the real property which is the subject matter of this litigatioh
in that the State of Utah, by and through the State Department
of Social Services legally and lawfully sold said property by
Sheriff's Sale on October 1, 1980 pursuant to a Judgment entered
against Lester Romero, also known as Ralph G. Romero on June 29,
1979 in case number 216937. Owen Rushton and Carol Rushton are
the legal, lawful owners of said property pursuant to said
Sheriff's Sale.

000053
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ADDENDUM

August 31, 198/. The lower court's dismissal in favor of
Defendants Rushton and Third-Party Defendantsf State of Utah,
should be sustained.
DATED t h ;

day of A p r i l , 1 9 8 8 .

2PHEN G. SCHWENDIMAW

K:

Chief, Assistant Attorney General^
Tax & Business Regulation Div.

Assistant Attorney General
Tax & Business Regulation Div.

>^JEONARD E. MCGEE
-^Assistant Attorney General
Tax & Business Regulation Div.

(

MILIN£_CERTIFIQA£E
I certify that on this _£&_

day of April, 1988, I

caused to be mailed, by deposit in the United States Mail, two
copies of the foregoing Brief to the following:
Lor in N. Pace
350 South 400 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Henry S. Nygaard
Beaslin, Nygaard, Coke & Vincent
330 North 3rd West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116

- 45 -

existed until six months from September 30, 1987 as set forth in
the Order of Judge Young dated September 30, 1987.
reason to overturn the lower court*

There is no

The decision should be

affirmed.
It is emphasized that in the original answer filed by
Mr. Nygaard for Defendants at paragraphs 3 and 4.C. (R 54).
Defendant Rushton's specifically allege that the conveyances by
which Maxfield claimed his interest were fraudulent; that the
Defendants Rushtons, and the Third-Party Defendant State of Utah,
Co-Respondent have set this at issue in each of their pleadings
and at all oral arguments the allegations that Maxfield had
doubtful interest the properties in question though admitted
recorded title.
Appellants have wholly failed throughout this
protracted litigation to prove their title and/or interest and
were not prepared to do so on August 31, 1987, and Judge Young,
based on the record and the statements at pre-trial, acted
properly in dismissing said action.
The dismissal of the case in its entirety by Judge
Young leaves at rest this issue and all other factual disputes as
Plaintiffs were not prepared for trial on September 15, 1987, as
they were so ordered to be.

This puts to rest the issue of

Rushtons' proper interest in the real property as purchased at
sale.

This factual issue is not before the Court, nor should it

be considered in this appeal.

All issues in fact and law were

dismissed, rightly, as to Plaintiffs at the pre-trial hearing on
- 44 -

ownership prior to the transfer; (3) the State's judgment was
obtained at a time when the property was in the name of Lester
Romero on the records of the Salt Lake County Recorders Office.
This Court should therefore sustain the actions of the
Trial Judge in dismissing the matter for failure to prosecute as
has been previously argued. In so doingf this issue is
extinguished as an issue for the Court to consider.
CONCLUSION
This matter has been set for trial four times.
Appellants continuously sought more time to prepare even to and
including the Septemberf 1987 trial setting.

At all times, the

Defendants and Third-Party Defendant and Co-Respondents State of
Utah were prepared to go to trial.

The Trial Court did not abuse

its discretion in dismissing the case for failure to prosecute.
This court should affirm that decision.
The Third District Courtfs denial of the Motion for
Summary Judgment on the 27th day of March, 1981 by Judge James
Sawaya and the subsequent answer filed by Respondent Rushtons',
left the allegation of fraud as a factual issue to be determined
at trial.

This action on the

part of the court was proper and

should be sustained.
Judge Sawaya1s Order of March 27, 1981, preserved to
Appellant any right of redemption he may have in himself or
through the original conveyor, Lester Romero or any of the
alleged invalid corporate entities or partnerships through which
Maxfield claims his chain of title, and that right of redemption
- 43 -
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Reed R. Maxfield
410 East 7620 South
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone 255-8465

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
OOOOO

REED MAXFIELD,
Plaintiff,
vs.
OWEN A. RUSHTON and
CAROL RUSHTON, his wife,
Defendants.

OBJECTION
TO HEARING ON
MOTION FOR IMMEDIATE
TRIAL DATE
AND
ANY OTHER MOTIONS
NOW PENDING

OWEN A. RUSHTON and
CAROL RUSHTON, his wife,
Civil No. 80-8167

vs.
STATE OF UTAH, BY AND THROUGH
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL SERVICES,
Third Party Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH, BY AND THROUGH
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL SERVICES,
Third Party Defendant
and Third Party
Complainants,

vs.

Judge:

David Young

.10 *»* \)t»*>

S 8 l

\esC.Bn^-

8

fi°n

ut>^

txP^e*:

snsir?0~

:

vs.
REED MAXFIELD,

t

Plaintiff and Third
Party Defendant.

:

The defendants# Owen A. Rushton and Carol Rushton, by
and through their attorney, Henry S. Nygaard, move the court to
set an immediate trial date in the above-entitled matter upon the
grounds that the case has been pending since 1980.

Furthermore,

discovery has been completed and although the plaintiff, Reed
Maxfield, has filed for protection under the bankruptcy laws of
the United States, the Bankruptcy Court Judge John Allen has specifically lifted any stay of proceedings and has authorized the
Third Judicial District Court to hear the above-entitled matter
at its pleasure.
DATED this

Jl

day of April, 1987.
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT

Hen/y (jL Nygaard
Attorney for Defendants

-2-

HENRY S .

NYGAARD, ESQ.

(#2435)

BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE 6 VINCENT
Attorneys for Defendants
333 North 300uWest
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Telephone: (801) 328-2506
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

REED MAXFIELD,
Plaintiff#

:
:

vs.

:

OWEN A. RUSHTON and
CAROL RUSHTON, his wife,

•
•

MOTION FOR IMMEDIATE
TRIAL DATE

Defendants,
:

OWEN A. RUSHTON and
CAROL RUSHTON, his wife,
Third Party
Plaintiffs,

Civil No. 80-8167

vs.
STATE OF UTAH, by and through
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL SERVICES,
Judge:
Third Party
Defendant,

STATE OF UTAH, by and through
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL SERVICES,
Third Party Defendant :
and Third Party
Complainant,
t
-1-

David Young

STATE OF UTAH
County of Salt Lake

)
) SS:
)

ALICE ANDERSENf being duly sworn, says:
That she is employed in the offices of Beaslin, Nygaard,
Coke & Vincent, attorneys for defendants and third party plaintiffs, Owen A. Rushton and Carol Rushton herein; that she served
the attached Notice to Appoint Substitute Counsel upon the
following individuals by placing a true and correct copy thereof
in an envelope addressed to
Reed Max field
410 East 7620 South Street
Midvale, Utah 84047
Lorin N. Pace, Esq.
136 East South Temple
1200 University Club Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Charles C. Brown, Esq.
36 South State Street, #2000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
William T. Thurman, Esq,
Attorney at Law
1200 Kennecott Building
10 East South Temple Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Stephen C. Schwendiman, Esq.
130 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
and depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage prepaid thereon, in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah,
on the 20th day of March, 1987.

. _?IVA< (/^c/.a^

„

Subscribed and sworn to before'me this" 120thr^day of
March, 1987.
'
^
<L
\
My Commission Expires:
7/21/87

Notary(JPublic
Residing at SaltLake City, UT

•;

'9/

HENRY S. NYGAARD, ESQ. USB NO. 2435
Attorney for
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT
333 North 300 West Street
Salt Lake City, Uah 84103
Telephone No. 328-2506

it-f.

>,'-. IJT/.K

:7

•/
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

REED MAXFIELD,
Plaintiff,

NOTICE TO APPOINT
SUBSTITUTE COUNSEL

vs.
OWEN A. RUSHTON, et ux.,

HONORABLE SCOTT DANIELS
Civil No. C-80-8167

Defendants.

3?

TO THE PLAINTIFF ABOVE NAMED:
Owen A. Rushton and Carol Rushton, his wife, defendants
and third party plaintiffs in the above entitled matter, hereby
give notice to the plaintiff that they intend to press the above
entitled matter to a conclusion, and therefore, plaintiff should
appoint substitute counsel to represent him in this matter, or
be prepared to appear personally.
DATED this 20th day of March, 1987.
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT

By. , / h . 9 f e * ^

•

Henry/S. Nygaard
Attorney
for Owen A. and
Carol Rushton

vs.
REED MAXFIELD,
Plaintiff and Third
Party Defendant.

Please be advised that Lorin N. Pace has withdrawn as
counsel for the Plaintiff in the above entitled action.
DATED this

L

j

day November, i966-r

/<}£/

OuOi t^M

Lorin' N. Pace
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Notice of
withdrawal of Attorney was mailed, postage pre-paid, to Charles C.
Brown, Beneficial Life Tower #2000, '36 South State Street, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84111; William Thomas Thurman, Suite 1200 Kennecott
Building, 10 East South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84133; Stephen
C. Schwendiman, Assistant Attorney General, 130 State Capitol, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84114; and to Henry S. Nygaard, 333 North 300 West
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84103, this

/'/W I ^j

/

day of

^ , *9efr. /<???

A^zX^^t^

2

LHLJVJFL} |
ni£:--.;:r,.r, ,
:
, '. ' \-e

SA :

7.34

H.V? £ fj ls/!M«g7
Lorin N. Pace #2498
PACE & BJORKLUND
1200 University Club Building
136 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-1300

CM** ttfcyt^

Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

REED MAXFIELD,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:

OWEN A. RUSHTON and CAROL
RUSHT0N, his wife.

:

Defendants.

NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL
OF ATTORNEY

Civil No. 80-8167

OWEN A. RUSHTON and
CAROL RUSHTON, his wife,
Plaintiff,
vs.
STATE OF UTAH, BY AND THROUGH
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL SERVICES,
Third Party Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH, BY AND THROUGH
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL SERVICES,
Third Party Defendants
and Third Party
Complainants,

:
:
:
:
1
—

^-r>rt

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and exact copy of the
foregoing ORDER ON MOTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES,
STATE OF UTAH TO LIFT A STAY was mailed first class, postage
prepaid, to the following on this /(s

day of February, 1987:

Henry S. Nygaard, Esq.
333 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, UT 84103

Charles C. Brown, Esq.
Attorney at Law
Beneficial Life Tower
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Douglas Cannon
Twelfth Floor
215 South State
Salt Lake City, UT

Brian Cannon
210 Prowswood Plaza
4885 South 900 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

84111

Reed R. Maxfield
410 East 7620 South
Midvale, UT 84017

William Thomas Thurman, Esq.
Attorney at Law
Kennecott Bldg.
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

f\

'WA 'In

BERNARD M.[TANNER
A s s i s t a n t Attorney Qeneral
for the S t a t e of Utah

hereby c c " ; ' v l : -r; ih? a-.r^xed and :oreooin&
?. true £ ? : c o " : '
c" .• <:.' a document on
o in the U.-.
. .. ;
L _- -^k.-uptcy Court
r the District GJ • rt ^._
Datec:TEB2 5 W
Attest: •
Deputy Clerk

-3-

3.

Tnat the State of Utah be granted a judgment

evidencing tnat said execution and sale were proper*
4.

For such other and further relief as to the court

seems proper.
DATED this _.£:J

day of

984.

TERNARD M. TANNE

A s s i s t a n t Attor

J~SCHWENI>IMAUA s s i s t a n t Attorney General

0002

5.

That on information and oelief, the Third-Party

Defendant and Third-Party Claimant alleges they can produce a
witness at trial who is prepared to testify tnat he spent more
than four months attempting to find a person of Lee Flynn, an
officer of Golden Circle, and that ne was unable to locate sucn a
person, and on said representation, does not believe that Lee G.
Flynn exists as an individual or as an officer of said Golden
Circle Investment, the purported conveyor of title to Reed
Maxfield, Plaintiff herein.
6.

Tnat based on the affidavit of Stephen G.

Schwendiman, Assistant Actorney General, specifically paragraphs
11 tnrougn 15, a question as to the validity of plaintiff's title
and a question as to the validity of tne interest of Reed
Maxfield, if any, in tne subject properties is raised as a
serious question of fact and tne same is entitled to both
discovery and strict proof at trial*
7.

Tnat it would be just and proper for plaintiff to

nave tne burden to prove good title prior to establishing nis
standing to sue as tne one proceeds the other.
Wherefore Third-Party Defendant and Thira-Party
Complainant prays for relief as follows:
1.

Tnat should the Rusnton's obtain judgment against

the State of Utah, tnat the State of Utah would nave judgment
over and against Reed Maxfield in total cased on a failure of
good title in the Plaintiff, the moving party herein.
2.

That the State would be reimbursed for costs and

attorneys fees for this action against Reed Maxfield, plaintiff
herein, for an action brought without proper standing.

000206

COMES NOW Bernard M. Tanner, and Stephen G.
Schwendiman, Assistant Attorneys General, on behalf of the State
of Utah, by and through Utah State Department of Social Services,
the Third-Party Defendant and Third-Party Complainant in this
case, and amend their Third-Party Complaint as follows:
1.

That the State of Utah is entitled to judgment over

and against Reed Maxfield, Plaintiff, if judgment against the
State of Utah is taken by tne Rushtons*
2.

Tnat on information and belief, it is alleged that

the transfer of wnatever interest the plaintiff, Reed Maxfield,
obtained from Golden Circle Investment was not a bona fide
transfer for value and was not a transfer of good title, and the
same was invalid, and that the deed and existing evidence of
payment of said deed are questionable if not fraudulent, and
therefore the deed is not legal and the plaintiff, Reed Maxfield,
nas no standing to bring this action*
3.

Tnat if said transfer is invalid as alleged on

information and belief, the plaintiff does not have standing to
sue in tnis case, and has no standing to allege any rignt, title,
or interest in the property sold in case 216937 wherein the
interest of Lester R. Romero was sold based on the judgment in
tne aforementioned case.
4.

That based on the answer and counter-claim, there

is no evidence as to questionable posting or improper sale as to
the Colorado Street property, and this court should find that tne
question, if any, as to improper sale attacnes solely to the 3020
West 2995 South property.
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PILED «N CLPRK'S OPPICE
Salt Lake County Utah

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
BERNARD M. TANNER
Assistant Attorney General
STEPHEN SCHWENDIMAN
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: 533-5007

^FP 2 4 1984
Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
REED MAXFIELD,
Plaintiff,

AHfittDBf) THIRD PARTY
COMPLAINT

vs.
OWEN A. RUSHTON and CAROL
RUSHTON, h i s w i f e .

Defendants.
OWEN A. RUSHTON and CAROL
RUSHTON, h i s w i f e ,
vs.

STATE OF UTAH, by and through
Utah State Department of Social
Services,
Third Party Defendants

C i v i l Number 8 0 - 8 1 6 7

STATE OF UTAH, by and through
Utan State Department of Social
Services,
Third Party Defendant
and Third Party Complainant,

vs«
REED MAXFIELD,
Plaintiff and
Third Party Defendant

(JGUZ04

Bankruptcy No. 84A-03391

Bernard M. Tanner, Assistant Attorney General for the
State of Utah, was heard on the motion.

Henry Nygaard, Esq.

appeared for the defendants in the state action previously filed
by Mr. Maxfield.

Charles Brown, Esq. appeared with Mr. Maxfield

and represents Utah's Great Game Preserve as that interest may
appear.

After argument by all parties and the Court being fully

apprised of the nature of the motion,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

1.

The motion to lift a stay is denied.

2.

As this is an action by the debtor as a party

plaintiff against third parties, this claim was not subject to an
automatic stay under Section 362(d) of the Bankruptcy Code.
3.

The matter should be tried in state court where

it commenced as there is no stay in Bankruptcy No. 84A-03391
against Civil No. 80-8167 in the Third District Court for the
State of Utah.

£-£$-$1
BY THE COURT:

Bankruptcy Judge
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DAVID L. WILKINSON #3472
Attorney General
STEPHEN C. SCHWENDIMAN 12891
Division Chief
BERNARD M. TANNER #3185
Assistant Attorney General
Tax t Business Regulation Div.
130 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Telephone: (801)533-5319

FED 25 1987
OFFICE Or JUDGE
JOHN H. ALLEN

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION

IN THE MATTER OF REED R.
MAXFIELD,
Debtor.

:
)
:
)
«
)
:

Bankruptcy No. 84A-03391
(Chapter 11)
ORDER ON MOTION OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
SERVICES, STATE OF UTAH TO
LIFT STAY

This matter came before the Honorable John Allen,
Bankruptcy Judge, February 20, 1987 at 4:18 p.m., and is amended
to be in Bankruptcy No. 84A-03391 rather than 84A-00391 as noted.
This is on a motion by the State of Utah, a third party defendant
and third party complainant in a Third District Court case, Civil
No. 80-8167, wherein Reed R. Maxfield, debtor in this case, is a
party plaintiff.
This proceeding was to request a lift of stay to allow
an immediate trial of this matter in Third District Court of the
State of Utah.

Civil No. 80-8167
Page 4

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and exact copy of the
foregoing MOTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
SERVICES, THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT AND THIRD PARTY COMPLAINANT,
RENEWED REQUEST FOR IMMEDIATE TRIAL AND MOTION TO DISMISS THE
OBJECTION PREVIOUSLY FILED BY ATTORNEY CHARLES BROWN TO
PROCEEDING WITH TRIAL was mailed first class, postage prepaid, to
the following on this

4o

day of February, 1987:

Henry S. Nygaard, Esq.
333 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, UT 84103

Charles C. Brown, Esq.
Attorney at Law
Beneficial Life Tower
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Douglas Cannon
Twelfth Floor
215 South State
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Reed R. Maxfield
410 East 7620 South
Midvale, UT 84017

Brian Cannon
210 Prowswood Plaza
4885 South 900 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
William Thomas Thurman, Esq,
Attorney at Law
Kennecott Bldg.
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Wmpfl

BERNARD M. TANNER
Assistant Attorney General
for the State of Utah

Civil No. 80-8167
Page 3
Counsel respectfully requests the matter be set for
hearing for argument on the

day of March, 1987 in district

court before the Honorable

,

Judge of the Third District Court so that a trial date may be set
and further that the Court may rule on the motion of the State of
Utah to dismiss the objection of Charles Brown, Attorney at Law,
on behalf of parties as th^ir interest may appear.
DATED this

A ? day of February, 1987.

BERNARD M. TANNI
Assistant Attorney General

Civil No. 80-8167
Page 2
Third Party
Defendant and
Third Party
Complainant,
vs.
REED R. MAXFIELD,
Plaintiff and
Third Party
Defendant.

s
)
:
)
)
s
)
)
:
)

Comes now Bernard M. Tanner, Attorney for the State of
Utahf Utah State Department of Social Services, and respectfully
petitions the Court in this renewal of the motion of Defendants
filed November 24, 1986, to proceed with trial and further, a
motion to dismiss the objection to readiness for trial as
previously filed by attorney Charles Brown for parties as his
interest may appear.
The basis for this renewal of our motion for immediate
trial is that a motion for lifting stay in bankruptcy court was
filed, a hearing was held on the 20th day of February, 1987 at
4:20 p.m. before the Honorable John Allen, and based on the
representations of the party the Court ruled that due to the fact
that the motion in district court is by Reed Maxfield as a
plaintiff against third parties not a party to the chapter 11
bankruptcy proceeding he filed, that there is no automatic stay
under Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code.

DAVID L. WILKINSON #3472
Attorney General
STEPHEN C. SCHWENDIMAN #2891
Division Chief
BERNARD M. TANNER #3185
Assistant Attorney General
Tax & Business Regulation Div.
130 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Telephone: (801)533-5319

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

REED R. MAXFIELD,
Plaintiff,
vs.
OWEN A. RUSHTON and CAROL
RUSHTON, his wife,

Civil No. 80-8167

Defendants.
OWEN A. RUSHTON and CAROL
RUSHTON, his wife,
vs.
STATE OF UTAH, by and
through Utah State
Department of Social
Services,
Third Party
Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH, by and
through Utah State
Department of Social
Services,

MOTION OF THE STATE OF
UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
SERVICES, THIRD PARTY
DEFENDANT AND THIRD PARTY
COMPLAINANT, RENEWED
REQUEST FOR IMMEDIATE TRIAL
AND MOTION TO DISMISS THE
OBJECTION PREVIOUSLY FILED
BY ATTORNEY CHARLES BROWN
TO PROCEEDING WITH TRIAL

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the
caused
correct

to

be mailed,

copy

of

''}%*•' day of November,

first class postage prepaid,

the foregoing Objection

to

1986, I

a true

Certification

Readiness for Trial to:
Henry S. Nygaard
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT
333 North 300 West Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84103
William T. Thurman
MCKAY, BURTON & THURMAN
Suite 1200 Kennecott Bldg.
10 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84133
Stephen C. Schwendiman
Assistant Attorney General
130 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Lorin N. Pace
University Club Bldg., #1200
136 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

4

and
of

Great Game Preserves and counsel need to be finalized,
DATED this

-ffi

day of November, 19 86.

own

3

REED MAXFIELD,

:

Plaintiff and
:
Third Party Defendant.
00O00
Charles C. Brown as counsel for Utah's Great Game Preserves,
a Chapter 11 debtor - for this purpose only files this objection:
1)
confirmed

Reed

Maxfield filed a Chapter 11 in 1985 and

Plan of Reorganization transfers this claim to

the

Utah f s

Great Game Preserves.
2)
when

Maxfield

pleadings

A Motion to Amend Maxfield's pleadings was
filed

his

petition.

Before

pending

proceeding,

the

should be amended to add claims against the State

and

Stephen C. Schwendiman.
3)
taken

of

daughter

Discovery is not complete.

the secretary to Stephen C.

need

Schwendiman,

of the Rushtons who bought the homes at

sale conducted by Schwendiman.
the

Depositions need to be
who is

the

the

Sheriff's

A deposition needs to be taken of

Sheriff serving the notices at the property.

A

deposition

to be taken of an assistant County Attorney having relevant

knowledge of certain issues.
and answered.
4)
5)
himself

with

discussions.

Interrogatories need to be

served

Documents need to be produced.
A stay in the Bankruptcy is effective to date.
This
the

attorney

has not had

case in order to

Further,

an

have

time

effective

agreement between

2

to

familiarize
settlement

Maxfield,

Utah's

furfi ill GUMS 8MIC*

Charles C. Brown
Jeffrey B. Brown
BROWN & BROWN, P.C.
?
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2000 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-9333

ILL
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
OOOOO

REED MAXFIELD,
Plaintiff,
vs.
OWEN A. RUSHTON and
CAROL RUSHTON, his wife,

OBJECTION TO
CERTIFICATION OF
READINESS FOR TRIAL

Defendants.
OWEN A. RUSHTON and
CAROL RUSHTON, his wife,

Civil No.I 80-8167

vs.
STATE OF UTAH, BY AND THROUGH
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL SERVICES,
Third Party Defendants,
STATE OF UTAH, BY AND THROUGH
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL SERVICES,
Third Party Defendant
and Third Party
Complainants,

vs.

for in Rule A.l of the Rules of Practice of the District and
Circuit Courts, effective March 1, 1982.

BY THE COURT

-4sm'P&y-

Reed R.

Maxfield

Plaintiff

and

third party

defendant

Reed Maxfield

for tiimself files this

objection:

1. Reed M a x f i e l d as a layman is not capable of properly
d e f e n d i n g this case himself and needs a Lawyer to do so.
2.
Reed M a x f i e l d met with Loni F. Deland, A t t o r n e y at Law
around the 1st of April 1967 and asked Mr. Deland to represent
him in this case. I did leave my files with M r .
D e l a n d and
later o b t a i n e d other e x h i b i t s he requested and then took those
to his o f f i c e . M r . D e l a n d informed me at that m e e t i n g he would
be out of S t a t e on some other law suits off and on during April
and he thought he could look my case over in a couple of weeks
and would then let me know.
He said from what I told him he
probably would want the c a s e . He did tell me he was booked with
trials and case loads really heavy through J u n e .
3. H o w e v e r it was about the first week of May before he had a
Mr.
M c R a e , a Lawyer from V e r n a l , Utah came to Salt Lake City
I spent time on two different days going over
and contacted m e .
and reviewing the case with Mr. M c R a e .
I was real pleased with
the k n o w l e d g e M r .
M c r a e had from studying the case before I
even met with him the first day. M r . Deland has not been able
to p e r s o n e l l y meet with me since our 1st m e e t i n g .
4.
M r . Deland wrote me a letter dated May 13, 1987 (5 days
a g o ) stating he and M r . M c R a e had reviewed my file and had
d i s c u s s e d the matter of r e p r e s e n t i n g me as per my r e q u e s t .
And
he stated they were w i l l i n g to represent me on certain f i n a n c i a l
terms.
5.

I received

6.
I was
Deland in
bills and
letter of
fees came

that letter today Monday

18the May

1987.

careful in r e p r e s e n t i n g my f i n a n c i a l p r o p o s a l to Mr.
April c o n c e r n i n g the paying for the cost of Attorney
court c o s t s . The terms M r . Deland p r e s e n t e d in his
the 13th c o n c e r n i n g their counter p r o p o s a l of Attorney
to me as a s u r p r i s e and was very d i f f e r e n t .

7.
I will ( d i l i g e n t l y ) seek new council with (up m o s t ) speed if
with in this week I cannot come to terras with M r . M c R a e and Mr.
Loni Deland on A t t o r n e y f e e s .
8.
I did by letter in April inform Mr.
Nygaard that I had
c o n t a c t e d M r . Loni D e l a n d and requested he r e p r e s e n t me in this
case.
And it is only the ( c o u n t e r ) offer they have made to my
o r i g i n a l p r o p o s a l on p a y i n g their A t t o r n e y fees that is

presently

stopping their r e p r e s e n t i n g me in this

case

9.
T h e r e is some very technical unfinished issues involved that
a layman such as I could not begin to h a n d l e .
Plus I need to
amend ray C o m p l a i n t .
10 I will within 2 w e e k s notify
as to my p r o g r e s s .

both the court and M r .

Nygaard

11.
I, therefore request that the motion by M r .
N y g a a r d and
any other pending m o t i o n be cancelled while I ( s p e e d i l y ) obtain
other legal council to represent m e .

Dated

this 18 day of May

Reed
Copy to Henry

1987.

Maxfield

Nygaard.

^^^)
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT O F THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE O F UTAH

7S>rfl 7 f t r H / ^ P
" ' U
Plaintiff(s),

:

SCHEDULING ORDER AND
TRIAL NOTICE

:
A

V8.
Defendant(s).

CASE HO.^ft9-<f/<W
:

Pursuant to the scheduling conference held on.
the following dates were set and matters discussed:
1. T h i s case is set for trial on:SvpT/^/UA
/y/<?f~?CLJL//0:<?&<:
2. Anticipated trial tine is
2>
days..
3. This case is set for (non-jury^uryj^trial. If jury
fee is not paid, it will be paid withinTCTdays of the date
of this order by plaintiff/defendant.
4. A l l d i s c o v e r y must b e completed, including the filing
of depositions with the Court b y
.
5. A final pre-trial will be held before the Court on
(tuo/,<^
&/ /<?<*-? at
J^:nr>
p . m . Counsel w h o will try
the c&se are to be present. Clients or an individual with authority
to settle the case are also t o b e present.
6. Date to hear dispositive motions is %//n/X"7
.
7. Other matters:

8. T h e foregoing dates should b e considered firm settings
and will not be modified without Court order and then only upon
a showing of manifest injustice.
9. T h i s o r d e r constitutes the only notice that the Court
will send to counsel.
Dated this /
day of b>^^V--, 19 <f 7

DAVID S. YOUN
DISTRICT COUR1
Copies of this scheduling order were mailed to the following
parties at the addresses indicated:

Dated: U//?*?

(LjLi "fL"^
COURT 0LERK

Charles C. Brown (1447)
Jeffrey B. Brown (0457)
BROWN, SMITH & HANNA
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
City Centre I, Suite 401
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-5656
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
REED MAXFIELD AND UTAHS' GREAT GAME
PRESERVE,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

MOTION TO CONTINUE
TRIAL DATE OR IN
ALTERNATIVE TO EXTEND
DISCOVERY AND MOTION
CUTOFF DATE

OWEN A. RUSHTON, CAROL RUSHTON, et
al.
Defendants.
OWEN A. RUSHTON and CAROL RUSHTON,
Case No. 80-8167
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
STATE OF UTAH, by and through Utah
State Department of Social Services,
Judge David Young
Third-Party Defendant and ThirdParty Plaintiff,
vs.
REED MAXFIELD,
Third-Party Defendant.
Come now plaintiffs, by and through counsel, and hereby move
this court for an Order continuing the trial date in <> the above
entitled matter for a period of approximately two months.
Alternatively, plaintiffs move this court for an order allowing

plaintiffs additional time past August 17, 1987 in which to
finalize discovery.

This motion is based upon the following

reasons:
1.

Although the case is very old, and has been stayed due

to the filing of Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Petitions by plaintiffs,
present counsel for plaintiffs only recently became involved.
2.

Counsel for plaintiffs have several Bankruptcy Court

trials set for trial in September, 1987, which trial dates have
been pending for many months, if not years, and which would be
inconvenient to reschedule.

Additionally, this courts/recently

set for trial in October a large case involving counsel, and
extensive preparation is needed to be ready to try that case.
3.

Present counsel has served Interrogatories, Requests for

Admissions and Requests for Production of Documents upon all
parties in the lawsuit, which were served July 15, 1987.
Responses to said discovery are due Friday, August 14, 1987.
Presently, this would only allow for completion of discovery by
way of depositions based upon said Interrogatories and Requests
on Monday, August 17, 1987, one business day after the responses
are due.

If the responses are not provided timely or are

evasive, no additional discovery could be completed.
4.

Plaintiffs intend to file an amended complaint on or

before August 17, 1987 naming additional defendants.

Time should

be allowed for said defendants to be served, to answer, and to
participate in discovery*

Further, the amended complaint may

raise new allegations and causes against the present parties to
the lawsuit, and additional discovery based upon that may be

necessary.

Additionally, by order of court, plaintiffs were to

file a reply to Rushtonfs Amended Answer and Counterclaim.
Plaintiffs have filed herewith a Motion to Dismiss all claims
based upon representations made to the Bankruptcy Court that no
claims were made against plaintiffs in this case, in order to
obtain relief from the automatic stay in order that this matter
could proceed.

Depending upon the outcome of that motion, some

discovery or additional time to plead should be allowed.
5.

Plaintiffs intend to finalize the depositions of the

Rushtons and to take depositions of Lyle Summers and several
Deputy Sheriffs.

Plaintiffs should be allowed some additional

time to do this.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs move this court for an order
continuing the trial dates in this matter, presently set for
September 15, 16 and 17, 1987, for a period of approximately two
months.

Alternatively, plaintiffs move this court for an order

allowing additional time past August 17, 1987 in which time to
conduct discovery.
DATED this ///—day of August, 1987.

/%M*
jeffreY/B^. Brown

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the

ID— day of August, 1987,

I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be handdelivered to:
Henry S. Nygaard
333 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, Utah

84103

Bernard Tanner
130 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

motrusht.uta

DAVID L. WILKINSON #3472
Attorney General
STEPHEN C. SCHWENDIMAN #2891
Division Chief
BERNARD M. TANNER #3185
Assistant Attorney General
Tax & Business Regulation Div.
130 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Telephone: (801)533-531S

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION

In Re REED R. MAXFIELD,
Debtor.
REED R. MAXFIELD,
Bankruptcy No. 84A-00391
Plaintiff,
vs.
OWEN A. RUSHTON and CAROL
RUSHTON, his wife,
Defendants.
OWEN A. RUSHTON and CAROL
RUSHTON, his wife,
vs.
STATE OF UTAH, by and
through Utah State
Department of Social
Services,

AMENDED PETITION OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, BY AND
THROUGH TtfE UTAH STATE
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
SERVICES, THIRD PARTY
DEFENDANT AND THIRD PARTY
COMPLAINANT, REQUEST FOR
IMMEDIATE TRIAL OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE FOR A LIFT OF
STAY TO ALLOW FOR TRIAL OF
THE PROCEEDING IN STATE
DISTRICT COURT IN CIVIL NO.
80-8167

Third Party
Defendants.

oo036*

STATE OP UTAH, by and
through Utah State
Department of Social
Services,
Third Party
Defendant and
Third Party
Complainant,

t
)
t
)
s
)
:
)
:
)

vs.

:
)

REED R. MAXFIELD,

t
)

Plaintiff and
Third Party
Defendant.

:
)
:
)

Comes now Bernard M. Tanner, Attorney for the State of
Utah, appearing in this case as third party defendant and third
party complainant in adversary proceeding and respectfully
petitions the Court that the matter be set immediately for trial
before this bankruptcy court or in the alternative that the stay
would be lifted to the degree that the parties may be allowed,
with the permission of the bankruptcy judge, to try this matter
at the earliest moment in Third District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, under the existing civil no. 80-8167,
the case number and location for the intended trial prior to the
filing of this bankruptcy proceeding.
It is alleged by counsel for the state tha^ it is in
the best interest of the parties to have a rapid trial of the

-2-

t^£9

remaining issues relative to the validity of the sheriff's sale
which occurred as subject of this case in Third District Court
and that it would be to the best interest of all parties
concerned to so proceed.
DATED this

~

day of February) 1987.

ERNARD M. TURNER
Assistant Attorney General
for the State of Utah
Third Party Defendant and
Third Party Complainant

-3-

0003^

DAVID L. WILKINSON #3472
Attorney General
STEPHEN G. SCHWENDIMAN #2891
Chief, Assistant Attorney General
BERNARD M. TANNER #3185
Assistant Attorney General
Tax & Business Regulation Division
Room 130 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone : (801) 533-5319
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
REED KAXFIELD AND UTAHS' GREAT
GAME PRESERVE,

]
>

>

OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO CONTINUE, OR IN
THE ALTERNATIVE, TO EXTEN
DISCOVERY AND MOTION
CUT-OFF DATE

>

C a s e No.

Plaintiffs,
>
vs.
OWEN A. RUSHTON, CAROL RUSHTON,
et a l . ,
Defendants.

OWEN A. RUSHTON and CAROL RUSHTON, ]i

Third-Party P l a i n t i f f s ,

]

vs.

STATE OF UTAH, by and through
Utah S t a t e Department of S o c i a l
Services,
Third-Part Defendants
and Third-Party
Plaintiff,
vs.

]

80-8167

Hon. David Y o u n g , J u d g e

REED MAXFIELD,
Third-Party Defendant.

)
)

Comes now Bernard M. Tanner* Attorney for State of
Utah, by and through Utah Department of Social Services, ThirdParty Defendant and Third-Party Plaintifff and objects to the
contents of the Motion as being factually inaccurate, failing to
state a proper basis, and failing to give proper notice to
parties, and hereby requests the same be dismissed and/or, in the
alternative, that the same be set for hearing on August 24, 1987,
at 9:00 a.m., before the Honorable Judge David Young.
DATED this 11th day of August,. 1987

QM/

BERNARD M. TANNER^
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for State of Utah

- 2

HENRY S. NYGAARD, ESQ. (Bar No. 2435)
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT
Attorneys for Owen A. RUshton and Carol Rushton
333 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Telephone: (801) 328-2506
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

REED MAXFIELD AND UTAH'S
GREAT GAME PRESERVE,
DEFENDANTS RUSHTON
OBJECT TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL
DATE OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,
TO EXTEND DISCOVERY AND
MOTION CUT-OFF DATE

Plaintiffs,

vs.
OWEN A. RUSHTON, CAROL RUSHTON,
et al,
Defendants.
OWEN A. RUSHTON and CAROL
RUSHTON,
Third Party
Plaintiffs,

Civil No. C80-8167
vs.
STATE OF UTAH, by and through
Utah State Department of Social
Services,
Third Party Defendant
and Third Party
Plaintiff,
Judge:
vs.
REED MAXFIELD,
Third Party Defendant.

-1

David Young

The defendants Rushton, by and through their attorney,
Henry S. Nygaard of the law firm of Beaslin, Nygaard, Coke 6
Vincent, object to the Notice of Hearing of plaintiffs' Motions to
Continue Trial Date or Extend Discovery and Motion Cut-Off Dates
and on Motion to Dismiss all Claims Against Plaintiffs set for
August 17, 1987, at 9:00 a.m. upon the grounds that the Motions
ultimately are in the nature of summary disposition of this
matter, and the defendants are entitled to ten (10) days notice
pursuant to the rules of Utah Civil Procedure.
Furthermore, defendants1 Motions presently before the
court are set for hearing on August 24, 1987, at 9:00 a.m., which
would be a more appropriate date for all of the parties to argue
all motions now before the court.
DATED this

//

day of August, 1987.
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT

Henry S/Nygaard
Attorney for Owen A. Rushton and
Carol Rushton
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DAVID L. WILKINSON #3472
Attorney General
STEPHEN J. SORENSON #3049
Chief, Assistant Attorney General
Litigation Division
BERNARD M. TANNER #3185
Assistant Attorney General
LEONARD E. McGEE #2185
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for the State of Utah
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 533-5261
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
REED MAXFIELD AND U T A H S ' GREAT
GAME PRESERVE,

DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO
PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED
COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs,
C i v i l No. C80-8167

v.
OWEN A. RUSHTON. CAROL RUSHTON,
et a l . ,
Defendants.

OWEN A RUSHTON and CAROL RUSHTON,
Third-Party

JUDGE DAVID YOUNG

Plaintiffs,

v.

STATE OF UTAH, by and through
Utah State Department of Social
Services,
Third-Party Defendant
and Third-Party Plaintiff,

REED MAXFIELD,
Third-Party

Defendant.
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COMES NOW the Defendant's and hereby object to the
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend
1987.

the Complaint, filed on August 17,

The grounds for said objection are as follows:
1)

The Statute of Limitations on the Causes of Action

2)

The Defendant's are prejudiced

have run;
in that the

Plaintiff has added additional parties, new causes of action, new
prayers for relief, the time for discovery

in the case has

passed, and a firm trial date has been set within 30 days of the
proposed

amendment;
3)

The Defendant's have filed a Motion for Summary

Judgment based on the Plaintiff's Second Amended
4)

Complaint;

The time for new motions has passed, which precludes

the Defendant's from further dispositive motions;
5)

The Courts' Order of June 8, 1987 bars further

motions, amendments to pleadings and discovery subsequent to
August 17, 1987.

The Plaintiff has not timely filed a Motion to

Amend with the Court.
6)

The Plaintiff has had ample opportunity to have

timely filed Amended Complaints, in that this matter has been
betore the Court for nearly seven years.
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DAVID L. WILKINSON

Attorney General
STEPHEN J. SORENSON
Chief, Litigation Division
Assistant Attorney General

ABARNARD TANNER
Assistant Attorney General

mi:±

LEONARD E. McGEE
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for State Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
This is to certify that I hand-delivered a copy of the
foregoing DEFENDANTS OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT
to the following this 21st day of August, 1987.
Charles C. Brown, Esq.
Jetfrey B. Brown, Esq.
Brown, Smith & Hanna
Attorneys for Plaintiff
City Centre I, Suite 401
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Henry S. Nygaard, Esq.
Beaslin, Nygaard, Coke & Vincent
Attorneys for Rushtons
333 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
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THE ABOVE ENTITLED CASE COMES NOW ON REGULARLY BEFORE THE COURT FOR
E-TRIAL CONFERENCE.

COUNSEL APPEARING AS NOTED ABOVE.

WHEREUPON THE FOLLOWING ISSUES ARE DISCUSSED BETWEEN RESPECTIVE COUNSEL
D THE COURT.

THE COURT NOW ORDERS THE ABOVE ENTITLED CASE BE SET FOR THE

LLOWING (SEE BELOW) OR SETTLED.
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DATE
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DISCOVERY CUT-OFF DATE

(2) MOTIONS
i

(3)

DATE FOR PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE
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TRIAL DATE
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Charles C. Brown (1447)
Jeffrey B. Brown (0457)
BROWN, SMITH 6 HANNA
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
City Centre I, Suite 401
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-5656
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

Office 0f AT

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
REED MAXFIELD,
Plaintiff,
MOTION TO WITHDRAW
vs.
OWEN A. RUSHTON, CAROL RUSHTON, et
al.
Defendants.
OWEN A. RUSHTON and CAROL RUSHTON,
Case No. 80-8167
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
STATE OF UTAH, by and through Utah
State Department of Social Services,
Judge David Young
Third-Party Defendant and ThirdParty Plaintiff,
vs.
REED MAXFIELD,
Third-Party Defendant.
COME NOW Charles C. Brown and Jeffrey B. Brown, attorneys
for Reed Maxfield in the above-captioned case, and hereby move
this court pursuant to Rule 2.8, Rules of Practice for the
District and Circuit Courts of Utah, for an Order allowing their
withdrawal as counsel on behalf of Reed Maxfield. Trial is

presently set for September 15, 1987. This Motion is based upon
the following grounds and upon the Affidavit of Jeffrey B. Brown
filed herewith:
1.
Pace.

There is an Attorney Lien in this case filed by Lorin

Current counsel agreed to appear in this case provided

that Mr. Maxfield would obtain from Lorin Pace a Release of the
Attorney's Lien.

Mr. Maxfield agreed to do this, and has

repeatedly represented that he has obtained said Release and
would provide it to present counsel, but, contrary to said
agreement and representations, he has not obtained or provided
said Release of Attorney's Lien.

It would severely jeopardize

the efforts of attorneys herein and would jeopardize the
possibilities of them being paid for their efforts to require
their continuance with said Attorney Lien in place.
2.

Current counsel agreed to enter into the case only upon

the express understanding and agreement that Mr. Maxfield would
sign a Fee Agreement secured by real property.

Pursuant thereto,

a Fee Agreement was prepared and documents necessary to pledge
real property were provided to Mr. Maxfield in early June, 1987,
immediately upon counsel coming into the case. • Mr. Maxfield
indicated that he would sign the Fee Agreement and pledge the
real property.

From time to time, at the request of current

counsel that these documents be provided, Mr. Maxfield has
repeatedly indicated that the Fee Agreement and security on real
property had been signed but that he did not have them in his
possession but he would obtain the same.
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He has still not

provided these to current counsel.
3.

On Friday, August 28, 1987, secretary for counsel

telephoned Mr. Maxfield to remind him of the time of the PreTrial Conference and also to remind him to provide to counsel the
Attorney Release of Lien, the signed Fee Agreement and the
security on real property during the morning of August 31, 1987.
To this request, Mr. Maxfield agreed.
4.

Despite said agreement, as of the time of the Pre-Trial

Conference, Mr. Maxfield has failed to provide counsel with the
Attorney Release of Lien, the Fee Agreement and the security on
real property.

Instead, after the telephone conference Mr.

Maxfield delivered letters to current counsel expressing his
displeasure with current counsels' handling of the case.
5.

As a result thereof, current counsel has no Fee

Agreement with Mr. Maxfield and cannot agree with Mr. Maxfield as
to how the case should be handled.

Mr. Maxfield has written

several letters indicating his displeasure with the way counsel
is handling his case and has expressed a dissatisfaction with
current counsel.
6.

Current counsel agreed to the early trial setting in

September based upon stipulation of opposing counsel that we
could file an Amended Complaint on or before August 17, 1987,
At the time of that stipulation, opposing counsel did not express
any concern about new parties who might be brought in or
additional discovery that might be made and therefore current
counsel was not concerned about it.
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However, upon filing the

Amended Complaint opposing counsel objected, contrary to earlier
agreement, and the filing of the Amended Complaint has been
denied by this court.

Trying the case under an Amended Complaint

was one of the basic reasons for entering the case, which has
been denied.
7.

Current counsel understood they would be handling this

case strictly as a claim by plaintiff to obtain assets for the
estate from defendants and would not be defending plaintiff from
any counterclaims of defendants, based upon the Relief from Stay
obtained from the Bankruptcy Court and based upon representations
made by opposing counsel to the Bankruptcy Court Judge.

Pursuant

thereto, current counsel filed Motions to Dismiss the
Counterclaims of the defendants against plaintiff which Motion
was denied.

This reason upon which counsel came into the case

has also been removed.
WHEREFORE, these attorneys respectfully request that the
court allow their withdrawal as counsel on behalf of Mr. Maxfield
based upon the foregoing factors.

It would be highly prejudicial

to current counsel to be required to continue through the case
given the disagreements between Mr. Maxfield, given the promises
which have been breached, given the fact that counsel have not
been able to obtain, despite diligent efforts and repeated
requests, a signed Fee Agreement secured by property which was
the basic understanding that counsel had with Mr. Maxfield upon
entering this case.

4

u ^ : day
. of August, 1987.
DATED this %r^
BROWN, SMITH & HANNA

Charles C. Brown, Esq.
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

TTgl

I hereby certify that on the O ^

day of August, 1987,

I mailed, first class postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing to:

Henry S. Nygaard
333 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, Utah

84103

Bernard Tanner
130 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Reed Maxfield
410 East 7620 South
Midvale, Utah #2047

mot2rush.max
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